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ASSASSINATION IN MODERN AMERICA:
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
THROUGH A GUN BARREL?

Richard Grossenbacher, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1993

Assassination has been a constant companion of the world’s societies from the
beginning of recorded history. Only relatively recently have social scientists begun
empirical study of these acts in an effort to reveal any commonalties and possible
predictive traits. Investigation of the assassination phenomenon assumed a special
urgency in America as violence seemed to escalate in the 1960s, which resulted in
some notable research.
The present research collected data of presidential and non-presidential
assassinations and attempts that occurred from 1969 through 1992 and compared the
findings with the results of earlier studies.
The data indicate that presidential assaults increased in frequency from 1969
through 1992 and that those attacks continued to be perpetrated by individuals seeking
to solve their respective problems via symbolic use of the presidency. The data
further reveal that non-presidential assassination differed in several respects from
presidential events and was remarkably more lethal.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Prologue

In mid-August 1992, the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in Florida and
Louisiana caused President George Bush to cancel several scheduled campaign stops
in order to address the crises. It had been announced that the President was to visit
Denver, Colorado, but that event became included in the postponements.
So, on September 15, after reshuffling the schedule, President Bush’s trip to
the Denver area took place. The Secret Service advance work had been done and an
outdoor rally site was secured at Inverness Business Park in the suburb of Englewood.
The visit occurred that day without apparent incident. There was nothing to indicate
the ominous plan of one who sought to attend the rally.
Deborah Butler, a thirty-three year old legal secretary from the Denver suburb
of Arvada, admitted herself to a local psychiatric hospital following the President’s
visit. There she announced that she "had just tried to shoot the President of the
United States." The FBI and Secret Service were immediately notified by hospital
authorities.

I
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On September 21, 1992, Butler was arrested and charged with the federal
crimes of attempting to assassinate the president and threatening the life of the
president.
The depth of her plot was discovered from interviews by agents of the Secret
Service and FBI and later a search of Butler’s car. She told agents that she had gone
to the location where the President was to speak at about 8:00 a.m. She intended to
gain close proximity to the President, but was deterred by the presence of metal
detectors at entry points. Butler chose instead to wait on a hillside overlooking the
motorcade entrance to the park. She had a .32 caliber revolver concealed in the
waistband of her slacks. While she waited, a deputy sheriff searched her backpack
during a routine "sweep" of the area. The gun was not detected.
Deborah Butler told the agents that she had purchased the gun about two
weeks prior and had practiced on a local range with ammunition purchased with the
gun.
She further revealed to the agents that as she approached the street to await the
passing motorcade, another spectator engaged her in conversation.

That brief

conversation reportedly diverted her attention long enough for the motorcade to pass
without incident. She then drove home, where her husband found her sitting in her
car. After she disclosed her activities to her husband, he drove her to the psychiatric
hospital, where she gained admission.
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She explained to the interviewing agents that she stalked the President in order
to assassinate him and draw attention to her problems related to her marriage and job
stress.
Entries into Deborah Butler’s diary, found in her car, are equally revealing. Butler
referred to Sara Jane Moore (attempted assassin of President Ford) as "the first
feminine role model in my 33 years of living, and she’s doing life without parole for
presidential plinking." On August 18, in reference to the President’s cancelled visit
to Denver, she noted, "So close! I was so close for 24 hours! . . . I guess I’ll just
have to wait a few weeks longer." On September 15, the day of the President’s visit,
she wrote, "It’s Tuesday, 7:45am, and I’m as ready as I’ll ever be. Please don’t let
me hurt anyone. Somebody please help me. I don’t want to handle it on my own
any more - I’m sorry."
Deborah Buder subsequendy pleaded guilty to threatening the life of the
president. In January 1993, she was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered
to undergo psychiatric treatment. The sentencing judge ruled that at the time of the
offense she suffered from reduced mental capacity.
This story is for you who are tempted to look back to the attempted
assassination of Ronald Reagan in 1981 and the relatively long interval since, and
wishfully think that the cycle of American presidential assassinations may be broken.
You may argue that this attempt was less than serious given the caliber of the
handgun and the President’s relative safety in an armored limousine. But consider
that it may well have been the sum of the circumstances rather than the intentions of
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the potential assassin that averted another national tragedy. Please read further into
this thesis.

You will discover parallels with other assassinations or attempts.

It

should become obvious that there is a need for continuing study into the phenomenon
we call assassination.

Research Overview

Societies have long been compelled to live with assassinations. From the
beginning of recorded history and no doubt before, leaders have been killed in a
variety of ways for a variety of reasons. So significant was the event and its impact,
that the assassination of Julius Caesar inspired no less a literary master than William
Shakespeare to write about it hundreds of years after the fact. The assassinations of
Archduke Ferdinand of Austria earlier this century is considered one of the threshold
events leading to the cataclysmic World War I. And who among us able to recall the
events of November 22, 1963, can forget an America thoroughly demoralized by an
assassination.
The United States’ experience with assassination appears to have begun in
1835, when an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of President Andrew
Jackson. No presidential assassination occurred before that and personally directed
political violence in the new republic was likely to take the form of two-man duels.
The death of Alexander Hamilton, resulting from a duel with Aaron Burring the early
19th century, helped turn public and official acceptance away from this practice,
which was eventually outlawed.
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As the Civil War ended, the United States lost its 16th president, Abraham
Lincoln, to an assassin’s bullet. The Reconstruction years saw unprecedented political
violence and assassinations as politically polarized groups such as the Ku Klux Klan
emerged from the ashes of the war.

Assassinations in those years were non-

presidential and the majority were confined to the states of the old Confederacy.
Consciousness of assassination increased with the murder of President
Garfield. Then, with the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, the task of
protecting presidents was mandated to the Secret Service, an agency created in 1865,
ironically by President Lincoln, to suppress the counterfeiting of currency.
Over the next five decades there were attempts against presidential candidate
Theodore Roosevelt, President-elect Franklin Roosevelt and President Harry Truman.
Senator Huey Long of Louisiana died from an assassin’s bullet during this period.
However, there was little sense of urgency to study these events or this phenomenon.
Possibly the lack of urgency existed because the victims survived three of the four
assaults and the events occurred over widely spaced intervals of time, which may
have created a feeling of isolation of the incidents. Whatever the reason, early studies
of assassination were largely historical narratives.
Amidst this turbulent period of civil rights confrontations and an escalating
war in Viet Nam were the assassinations of American Nazi George Lincoln Rockwell,
Black Muslim Malcolm X, civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and
presidential candidate Senator Robert F. Kennedy.
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This relatively rapid succession of political murders stimulated several serious
studies, mostly aimed at identifying causes and methods to prevent assassinations.
Perspectives ranged from broad macro comparisons of global violence to micro issues
of individual motivation to assassinate.

The results were more often than not

inconclusive and conflicting.
The research of this thesis uses two notable studies, one macro and one micro,
as its starting point. The National Commission for the Causes and Prevention of
Violence conducted a comprehensive research at the behest of President Lyndon
Johnson shortly after the assassination of Senator Kennedy in 1968. Although that
study included cross-national comparisons, the present research reviews only the
findings from their domestic studies. The Commission’s typology of assassinations
is also examined in the present study.
In its examination of the American phenomenon of assassination, the National
Commission concluded that the higher the office, the more impersonal the motive for
assassination. That is to say, presidential assaults appeared directed at the office as
a symbol. Conversely, assassinations of lower level officials have typically been
associated with various personal motives. Posed as a hypothesis, these findings will
be tested by the data of the present research, which covers the time period 1969
through 1992.
James W. Clarke approached American assassination from a very different
perspective in his research conducted in the late 1970s, which he subsequently
followed up after the attempted assassination of President Reagan in 1981. Clarke
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focused on the individual assassin and those personal and situational factors that
would compel one to commit this act. His research produced a typology of assassins
rather than of assassinations.
These two previous investigations were chosen as a basis for this research
because both are thorough, original and approach assassination from virtually opposite
perspectives. Both form a very appropriate basis for the present investigation.
One of the perplexing problems of researching assassination is in defining what
assassination is.

Definitions range from the simplistic political murder to more

complex, multi-tiered explanations. Although operational definitions are addressed
later in this report, it is important for the reader to understand this study’s definition
up front since this phenomenon is prone to some definitional ambiguity.
Assassination is herein defined as the homicide or attempted homicide directed
specifically at an elected or appointed officeholder, candidate for office, or an
individual in public political life. Methods and motives of assassination are not per
se defining factors.
First, let us consider some examples of what assassination is not and why they
are not. Dr. David Gunn, a physician employed at a clinic that performs abortions,
was killed by a "Pro-Life" activist in early 1993. While the issue for which Dr.
Gunn was murdered has political elements, he was not an officeholder, candidate or
person in political public life. In 1983 Gordon Kahl, a member of the tax protest
group Posse Commitatus, shot and killed a U.S. Marshal and Deputy U.S. Marshal
who attempted to arrest him. While the marshals were officeholders and the motive
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certainly political, the marshals became targets of Kahl only as he resisted arrest. In
late 1980, ex-Beatle John Lennon was shot and killed by an obsessed fan. While
Lennon was often politically outspoken, he was publicly known as an entertainer, and
while his murderers exhibited many of the traits and behaviors of assassins, it was his
obsession of Lennon as an entertainer that induced him to kill him.
This thesis maintains an exclusive definition of assassination in order to
differentiate it from other types of political murder.

Political murder is not

necessarily assassination, but assassination is necessarily political murder.

By

focusing the definition on the political status of the victim, the random killing that
often occurs during the episodes of terrorism or rioting can be excluded. However,
an assassination could result from terrorism or rioting, but does not receive its
definition by that larger phenomenon.
Assassination is also not defined by political impact, which is elusive to
quantify and complicated by normal, evolutionary changes in political and social
systems. Would ensuing events have occurred anyway? Logically, political murder
will have some political consequence. It may be confined to a replacement election
or appointment, or it could impact the political or social system in major ways as did
the assassination of President Lincoln.

In any event this research will make no

attempt to gauge political impact.
This research also examines and evaluates assassination as an act of political
participation. Conclusions are reached not on the outcome of an assassination, but
through the motive of the assassin.
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So this thesis examines the phenomenon of assassination through descriptive
case studies in an endeavor to learn which hypotheses and typologies, if any, are
supported by the most current data.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Prior Investigations

The phenomenon of assassination in America has only received any significant,
systematic attention and research since the notorius trio of assassinations in the
turbulent 1960s.

Two significant studies that resulted present very different

orientations to assassination. The typologies developed by the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and James W. Clarke will be tested by this
research. Those studies and two follow-ups are presented first.
This review of literature begins with Assassination and Political Violence by
James F. Kirkham, Sheldon Levy and William J. Crotty. The work, which consists
of a set of researches, comprehensively looked into the phenomenon of assassination
and was published as an omnibus staff report to the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence.

This select commission was appointed by

President Lyndon B. Johnson at the end of a decade that had witnessed the murders
of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Rev. Martin
Luther King, Jr., among others. This undertaking was not done for purely academic
reasons, but for the purposes of prediction and prevention.

10
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The American experience was the central focus. The study sought to reveal
any patterns of relationships of assassination with other types of violence, political or
non-political, as well as with the prevailing social conditions. American assassination
was examined in cross-national comparisons and as a separate phenomenon. Further
comparisons were made between American presidential and non-presidential incidents.
Assassinations were placed in historical and social contexts as well as juxtaposed with
one another.
Assassination was defined in terms of differentiating it from more "generic"
definitions of homicide.

By their definition an act must have:

(a) involved an

officeholder or candidate, (b) involved a political motive, and (c) ended with a
political impact. For their purposes it was unnecessary for all elements to be present
for an incident to become defined as an assassination (1969, p. 1).
In order to analyze the structure of motives for the various assassinations, a
typology was developed (1969, pp. 2-5).

The first type was created for the

assassination of one political elite by another, such as might occur during a coup. A
second type would occur in the course of a terrorism episode in an effort to
undermine the legitimacy of the ruling regime. A third type would be used by the
ruling elite to suppress challenges, as well-demonstrated by the Third Reich Nazis.
A fourth context for assassination would be for the purpose of dramatizing a
perceived injustice.

The assassination of British Lord Mountbatten by the Irish

Republican Army illustrates that category. And fifth, assassinations accomplished by
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mentally disturbed persons were deemed as irrational acts for irrational motives.
Most American presidential assassinations were typed thusly.
The study, which included all of the American assassinations which occurred
between 1835 and 1968, concluded that a disproportionately high number of
assassinations took place in the southern United States.

Over one-third of the

incidents occurred between 1865 and 1874, the so-called Reconstruction era (1969,
p. 43). However, this trend did not continue.
It was further discovered that the higher the office, the more impersonal and
political the motive for assassination (1969, p. 44).

Regarding presidential

assassination, variables such as party affiliation, political philosophy, public policy
or political strength were examined and were not found to be relevant (1969, p. 21).
The National Commission concluded that the preponderance of presidential assassins
fell within category five, acts of the irrationally mentally ill (1969, p. 5).
Assassinations of lower level officials were found to be identified with various
specific and personal motives, e.g., a judge killed by organized crime (1969, p. 44).
In the cross-national study, incidents in the United States were compared with
their foreign counterparts for the time period 1918 to 1968.

The researchers

discovered a direct correlation between the incidence of assassination in a nation and
its level of political violence, such as guerilla warfare and serious civil disturbance
(1969, p. 129). Societies prone to assassination tended also to be prone to a high
level of civil unrest.

Most significantly, the United States stood anomalous,

exhibiting a high comparative level of assassination without exhibiting those
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characteristics most closely associated (1969, pp. 136-139). The study also concluded
that the United States appeared to demonstrate those characteristics latently as
exemplified by relatively high levels of external aggression, minority hostility, high
incidence of homicide and a tendency for political unrest at the time of this study
(1969, pp. 165-167).
Although the study was unable to draw the type of conclusions necessary to
predict assassination events with any precision, the typology proposed by the authors
lends itself very well to the present research.
In 1971 one of the collaborators in the National Commission study, William
J. Crotty, authored Assassinations and the Political Order. The most significant
aspects of his study were the changes he proposed to the National Commission’s
typology.

He considered assassination in the United States to be anomic.

proposed it as a distinct and uniquely American type.

He

In addition to (a) anomic

assassination, he named the other types; (b) elite substitution; (c) tyrannicide; (d)
terroristic assassination; and (e) propaganda by deed (1971, pp. 10-13).
Crotty found that internationally the incidence of assassination was directly
correlated to frustration with the political or social system, inversely correlated to
modernity, and curvilinearly correlated to the coerciveness of the political system.
Highly permissive democracies and highly coercive regimes were found to be less
prone to assassination (1971, pp. 13-21). Again, he found assassination in the United
States anomic, committed by private individuals for personal motives.
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In American Assassin:

The Darker Side of Politics. James W. Clarke

conducted a case history research focusing on assassins as individuals. He argued
against the psychological stereotyping of American assassins, claiming that those
stereotypes promoted a spurious understanding of the phenomenon by the Secret
Service and other security agencies. He asserted that there is a tendency to categorize
most, if not all assassins, as "nuts." He also criticized the aforementioned National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence for basing some of its
conclusions on the same pathological stereotyping (1982, pp. 5-10).
Clarke argued that the psycho-pathological terms employed in previous
research were used so imprecisely and indiscriminately that conceptual problems were
created by the application of common descriptions to assassins who were actually very
different from one another (1982, p. 10). To describe his thought, but hopefully not
to oversimplify it, he outlined the common description typically used as including:
a diminishment of self-esteem, emotional isolation and distrust of others.

After

assigning this psychological description to an assassin, many researchers would infer
that the mind of the assassin would then progress to delusions of grandeur and
paranoid ideations, creating a distorted sense of reality. Clarke called this set of
factors and their progression a "pathological theory of assassination." He wrote that
those behavior traits would be manifested "... in the irrational act of assassination.
... The conclusions are essentially the same: the act is irrational and the assassin is,
therefore, delusional, deranged, or schizophrenic" (1982, p. 5). Clarke found this
"theory" to be patently unacceptable.
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Clarke further criticized the previous research for rarely considering the
political or social context of the assassination in relation to the assassin’s behavior.
He contended that some of the assassin’s so-called deviant or pathological behavior
was in fact not that extreme, rather, that previous researchers had simply failed to
consider the motives of the assassins studied within the contexts of their lives. Clarke
felt that the researchers had in fact trapped themselves in too easy an interpretation;
namely, that if one can characterize assassination as the manifestation of irrational
mental illness, then one need not acknowledge possible rational political or social
motives tor an act (1982, p. 258).
In formulating his typology, Clarke made a distinction between those few
assassins he viewed as truly psychotic (schizophrenic) from those that from the
evidence appeared to know and understand the nature of their acts. The weight of his
argument was th a t"... violence is an emotional act and something more than simple
aggression" (1982, p. 17).
Clarke’s Type I assassins are political idealists who are aware and accepting
of the meanings and consequences of their acts. They are rational in their extremism
and consider their act a self-sacrifice for a cause.

Clarke included presidential

assassins Booth, Czolgosz, Collazo, Torresola and Sirhan within this type.
Clarke’s Type II assassins are compellingly narcissistic. They are in no way
psychotic, but the need to be recognized and accepted is overwhelming. They have
so-called political personalities. He included Oswald, Byck, Fromme and Moore
within this type.
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Type III assassins are those Clarke considers psychopaths (sociopath is used
as an interchangeable term). They have formed a perverse anger toward society and
direct that anger at whomever they perceive that personifies the majority. Their acts
of destruction are desirable for their own sakes. They possess no positive values and
are hostile toward moral and social norms. They quite literally believe they have
nothing to lose. Clarke considered Zangara and Bremer Type III assassins.
Clarke’s Type IV assassins are the truly psychotic, suffering delusions and
hallucinations. They have no real sense of reality and are insane. Included in that
type are Lawrence, Guiteau and Schrank.
Clarke found that he was able to type fourteen of sixteen assassins he studied.
Two, James Earl Ray and Carl Weiss, were termed "atypical."
Because of the subtle differences among human beings, traits reflected in some
assassins crossed types. Clarke studied the personality of a given subject within
situational, social and cultural contexts.
Clarke concluded that his typology was unable to be predictive; that it could
provide some insights for operational security needs and determination of criminal
responsibility (1982, p. 266).

He suggested that since there obviously are many

persons in society that possess the personality traits

of the assassins,

yet sofew

attempt the feat, that assassination is as much a function of opportunity and
circumstances as personality characteristics (1982, p. 266).
Clarke commented further that in the age of instant mass media,
probability of assassination has increased.

the

Because of their penchant for gaining
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attention, his Type II and Type III assassins are likely to be more frequent (1982, pp.
267-268).
Clarke also concluded that increased domestic surveillance by security and law
enforcement agencies would unlikely solve the problem of persons acting alone. It
is further complicated by difficulties experienced to date by security agencies in
analyzing extant data (1982, pp. 268-269).
Clarke made a recommendation for handgun control by stating his belief that
opportunities for attack may be reduced, although the threat would remain (1982, pp.
269-270).
In an instance of serendipity, the above-cited study by Clarke was being
published as John Hinckley shot Ronald Reagan. Closely following that attempt,
Clarke conducted a follow-up research resulting in On Being Mad or Merely Angry:
John W. Hinckley. Jr.. and Other Dangerous People. This work further refined his
previous typology by using Hinckley’s attempt within the typology.
In this book Clarke attempted to proceed beyond the development of a mere
typology of assassins, once again acknowledging that his typology had little predictive
value. He undertook this second study to emphasize the situational and contextual
approach in understanding why some persons become assassins. In this research
Clarke addressed the issues of assessment and prediction of dangerousness. By using
traits of a type, particularly Type II and Type III, he attempted to demonstrate that
even the situational factors of the researched assassins of these types might have had
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short-term predictive value (1990, pp. 122-123). He supported his conclusions by
comparing several cases, most notably between John Hinckley and Arthur Bremer.
For instance, John Hinckley was categorized as Type III, specifically, as
emotionally disturbed, but exhibiting none of the delusions or hallucinations of
psychosis (1990, p. 81). Since Arthur Bremer was similarly categorized, Clarke
compared the various situational factors between the two (1990, pp. 81-98). Clarke
considered both psychopaths and they seemed to share the same lack of conscience.
Although these men came from decidedly different backgrounds, Clarke found
parallels in their lives beyond psycho-pathology. Case studies of both will appear
later in this thesis.
Clarke concluded by outlining his "situational approach," which utilized
specific behavior traits as indicators (e.g., stalking and interest in prior assassinations)
that he believed held incremental predictive value (1990, pp. 110-124).

Additional Sources - Assassination and Terrorism

This section includes additional studies, some conducted before and some after
the principal researches described above. All contributed to further understanding the
phenomenon of assassination.
Behavioral Science and the Secret Service, edited by Jane Takeuchi, Fredric
Solomon and W. Walter Menninger, summarized a workshop held in early 1981 by
the Division of Mental Health and Behavioral Medicine, Institute of Medicine. The
participants were from the medical/psychiatric community, academics and researchers
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from the behavioral sciences, members of the legal profession, and agents of the
United States Secret Service.
Although the thrust of the conference was a behavioral approach to the study
of assassination, political aspects were also addressed. While the conclusions of the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence were acknowledged,
these conferees dealt with various issues and problems of prediction.

While not

making any real breakthrough, the participants did identity problem areas for further
exploration.
Addressing problems of assessing dangerousness, the conferees concluded that
violent behavior is situational even in emotionally disturbed people. In other words,
a person may pose no risk except at the time(s) certain psychological and situational
circumstances present themselves in combination (1981, p. 29).

Their findings

supported Clarke’s position.
While emotionally disturbed or mentally ill persons may be violent at times,
it was generally held that those with better cognitive organization might present a
greater risk because of their ability to carry out a planned assassination.
The conferees of this workshop also placed great emphasis on anticipating
from what direction assassination may arise in future attempts. They suspected that
future assassins may include women, minorities, terrorists and political dissidents
(1981, pp. 39-41). Risk of assassination is enhanced by the access in the United
States to firearms (1981, p. 43).
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One unique aspect of this study was the consideration given to victim
behavior. In assessing the potential for assassination in the United States, particularly
presidential, any facilitating behavior by the assassination target is of course relevant.
This is that situational factor which often pits political considerations against security.
Victim behavior potentially offers the assassin the opening to circumvent security
arrangements (1981, pp. 43-44).
In American Presidential Assassination: Etiology and Prediction. Clark R.
Larsen argued against the profile of an assassin developed by the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence as simplistic and often
irrelevant. He demonstrated the many exceptions that have occurred before and since
the profile’s formulation (1986, p. 47).
Larsen explored the "mortality" aspects of presidential assassination in terms
of availability of effective security and medical treatment.

He found inverse

correlations respectively between the modernity of security and emergency medical
care and the death rate resulting from assassination attempts (1986, pp. 33-38).
Larsen considered the two most popular explanations for assassination, insanity
or conspiracy, then offered his own typology (1986, p. 48). He believed that the
motivation for assassination can by typed as mental, personal or political.

His

"mental" type included those individuals believed to be truly psychotic with
distortions of reality. Within the "personal" category are persons James W. Clarke
classified Type II and Type III. Larsen viewed these non-psychotic pathological traits
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in common and saw no reason to make finer distinctions. Those of the "political"
type are presumed to have acted from rational political motives.
Larsen concluded his study with a survey of problems in predicting
assassination, both micro and macro. He observed that development of predictive
models have been complicated by the relative paucity of incidents and persons to
study and by the fact that the designs of the studies by necessity had to be nonexperimental with no viable control group (1986, pp. 51-54).
In Assassin. J. Bowyer Bell observed that while Third World societies would
appear to be particularly conducive to assassinations, it is rather in some of the most
developed countries that assassins seem to thrive (1979, pp. 294-295).
In dealing with American assassins such as Lynette Fromme and Sara Jane
Moore, Bell deemed their motives to be personally therapeutic (1979, pp. 71-73).
He offered that their acts amounted to attempts at political murder without politics.
He supported that conclusion by examining the likely political consequences of the
attempts against President Ford.

He conjectured that had Fromme or Moore

succeeded, it likely would not have effected any real political change in the United
States at the time.
Bell concluded that, "The individuals most dangerous to the President of the
United States are those socially isolated who adapt to stress by symbolizing their
problems in a political idiom identified with the president" (1979, p. 74).
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It is also noteworthy that J. Bowyer Bell is one of few authors who
significantly addressed the person whose motive for assassination is financial, a
"Jackal" (1979, pp. 54-62).
James McKinley’s Assassination in America surveyed the assassination events
up to and including the 1975 attempts on the life of President Ford. He endeavored
to draw parallels between assassination incidents and the effects of the incidents.
McKinley devoted much of his writing to the various conspiracy theories
surrounding the respective assassinations. Not intending sensationalism, he seriously
explored several conspiracy theories for their probabilities of accuracy and as
competing theories of causation.
The only real prediction McKinley made was to observe that based on the
current (1975) rate of presidential assaults, an assassination or attempt could be
expected no later than 1984 (1977, p. 223). The 1981 attempt against President
Reagan vindicated his prediction.
Equally interesting was his general commentary about the impact of this
phenomenon upon American democracy. He observed that because of the rather
extreme measures employed now to protect our presidents, the net effect has been to
isolate them from their constituents.

Thus the democratic process is eroded by

inhibiting that close communication. The irony is that "... our assassins, who have
so many times killed for their peculiar vision of liberty, would have split a
cornerstone of the nation’s true freedom" (1977, p. 223).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In Political Murder:

From Tyrannicide to Terrorism. Franklin L. Ford

surveyed the phenomenon of political murder from an historical perspective. He
established three categories, general to specific: political murder, assassination and
tyrannicide. Assassination was the principle focus (1985, p. 2).
The author’s endeavor was to seek explanations for the frequency/infrequency
of assassination in various eras.

He found that high rates of incidents do not

necessarily coincide with epochs of repression or social turmoil. He also found that
low incident rates do not coincide with periods of relative calm or optimism. Rather,
he discovered that high incident rates occurred in periods following wars, revolutions
or colonizations (1985, pp. 382-383).
In evaluating the efficiency of assassination, Ford found that the vast majority
of incidents provided results beyond the stated intent of the perpetrator(s) (1985, pp.
387-388).

An example might be the assassination in World War II of the Nazi

commander Reinhard Heydrich by members of resistance forces, which led to the
retaliation massacre of villagers by the Nazi SS. He observed that regardless the
motive, assassination has disregarded the ideal of due process and as a political tool
has been self-defeating.
In Assassination and Terrorism: Their Modem Dimensions. Murray Clark
Havens, Carl Leiden and Karl Schmitt examined the relationships between the
assassination events and their political contexts (1975, p. 14). They sought to find
any patterns of events by examining six international cases occurring between 1934
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and 1966. They also attempted to assess the systemic impact and effectiveness of
these assassination events.
They concluded that assassination rates vary greatly over time, between
countries and within a country. They found the systemic impact to be low in general.
They offered the caution to those who would make inferences from their findings that
since all political systems to some degree are in a constant state of change, it is
difficult to assess or assign either short-term or long-term impacts of assassinations
(1975, p. 36). The immediate shock to a system accustomed to political violence may
be less and the impact may be very dependant on the nature and legitimacy of the
regime (1975, pp. 40-44).
The authors found assassination, as a tactic of terrorism, to be a random
phenomenon with periods of instability most conducive to its occurrence. Terrorism
was found to be more widespread as a phenomenon internationally, but primarily
existing in some major pockets of activity (1975, pp. 160-162).
In Perspectives on Terrorism. Harold Vetter and Gary Perlstein dealt with
operational issues of terrorism. They identified the beginning of modem terrorism
with the anarchists movement of the 19th century.

They also identified the

assassination of President McKinley as the final act of that movement in the western
democracies (1991, pp. 35-36, 46).
Vetter and Perlstein considered the victimology of terrorism (1991, pp. 6978). What differentiates terrorism in general from assassination as a tactic is the
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observation that victims of terrorism are largely random, but assassination victims by
definition are specific.
The authors explored the merging role of women in terrorism, not to be
trendy, but to demonstrate real gender changes taking place in this still maledominated activity (1991, pp. 106-119).
With assassination identified as a tactic of terrorism, Paul Wilkinson
considered the larger issue of the relationship of terrorism to the liberal state. In
Terrorism and the Liberal State, he set a theoretical framework for posing problems
particularly presented by terrorism. He emphasized the rule of law in the liberal state
and the right of the state to use legitimate force to preserve order (1986, pp. 15-17).
Wilkinson asserted a different causation between political and criminal
violence (1986, p. 34). He cautioned against ascribing precise reasons and motives
for terrorism, explaining that there is no general theory to explain grievances or
perceived grievances.
He asserted that the civil rights and freedoms of a liberal state are
opportunities which can be exploited by terrorists (1986, p. 103). He cited as an
example the advantage to the terrorist (assassin) of the relative safe and anonymous
environment in which to operate a liberal state offers.
Wilkinson noted the anomaly of the very low incidence of domestic terrorism
in the United States given the diversity of its population, its relatively high crime rate
and the availability of firearms (1986, p. 107). Unlike some other authors, Wilkinson
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did not make the distinction of the relatively high incidence of assassination in the
United States.

Additional Sources - Political Participation

This final review section directs our attention to the issue of whether or not
the act of assassination can be viewed as constituting political participation, however
unconventional it may appear. If it is, must it always be so considered or are there
some assassinations that are not acts of political participation? The typologies of
political participation presented by the following three sources would appear to
accommodate political violence as participation, although the first two deal with
participation as a primarily positive and conventional activity. The third includes both
conventional and unconventional acts. It is expected that the readers of this thesis,
after learning about the assassinations described herein, will see clearly that
assassination can be an act of political participation.
Lester Milbrath, in Political Participation, established a model for analyzing
the levels of political participation by individuals. This model was based in part on
the underlying hypothesis th a t"... the more stimuli about politics a person receives,
the greater the likelihood he will participate in politics, and the greater the depth of
his participation" (1965, p. 39). How one is predisposed to participate depends on
the needs of the actor.
Taking any political action generally requires two decisions: one must
decide to act or not to act; and one must decide the direction of his
action. ... Decisions to act in a particular way often are accomplished
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by a third decision about the intensity, duration, and/or extremity of
action. (1965, p. 6).
Milbrath developed a hierarchy of conventional, positive participation, of
which inactivity can be identified as the starting point from which involvement can
be measured (1965, pp. 18, 22-29). Citizen compliance, such as obeying laws and
paying taxes, are typical passive political responses (1965, p. 9). It is one’s exposure
to political stimulus then that triggers active participation.

Depending upon the

intensity of the stimulus and the needs of the individual, the activity may be limited
to "spectator" acts, such as voting or initiating a political discussion.

Milbrath

identified a "transitional" level of participation in which an individual may make a
monetary contribution or attend a political meeting or rally (1965, pp. 16-21).
Milbrath named his most active level of participation "gladiatorial" (1965, p.
20).

The various activities at this level require real commitment from the

participants. One may become a political party activist, become involved in strategic
planning of campaigns or rallies or solicit political funds (putting the participant as
an intermediary between the contributors and the decision makers). The ultimate
political participation is becoming a candidate for public office or holding public
office.
Milbrath found that anomic, alienated and cynical individuals are less likely
to become active in politics.

He also found that people with "great neurotic or

psychotic problems" are unlikely participants.

The are "... a different kind of
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individual whose orientation toward the world of politics is not simply one of
detachment, but of suspicion, distrust, hostility and cynicism" (1965, p. 79).
In this thesis we will make the argument that Milbrath’s basic hypothesis can
be extended to unconventional and negative acts.

Thus, if one receives political

stimuli, could not that person channel his/her participation into negative acts such as
demonstrations, harassment, riots or revolution? If this assertion is allowed, then it
could by extension be then argued that assassination stands as the ultimate, negative
political expression. This argument will be developed further.
In Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. Sidney
Verba and Norman H. Nie argued against Milbrath’s participation model as a one
dimensional hierarchy (1972, pp. 44-45). Their criticism was that the hierarchy
implied following his logic that that one who participates at a given activity level
would have likely participated at the lower levels as well. Verba and Nie do not
believe that this is necessarily so.
In place of a hierarchy of participation, Verba and Nie proposed four modes:
voting, campaign activities, citizen-initiated political contacts, and communal
participation (1972, pp. 51-53). Each of these modes represent methods by which
citizens can influence their leaders.

Each mode was also defined by the type of

influence exerted. For instance, voting was considered to exert a considerable amount
of pressure on someone wishing to be elected or re-elected, but to provide little in
information about the specific wishes of the voter.
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Other defining dimensions of the modes include conflict, scope of the
outcome, and the initiative required (1972, p. 54). Conflict involves zero-sum issues
among competing participants. The scope of the outcome deals with the impact that
an individual’s participation may have on other citizens. Initiative measures the effort
to participate in an act.
Verba and Nie offered a typology of "participators" to engage in activities via
the modes (1972, pp. 85-86). Placed along an inactive-active continuum, they are:
inactives, voting specialists, parochial participants (involvement with narrower
specific issues), communalists (involvement with broader social issues), campaigners,
and complete activists. The participation of the types of persons is channeled into the
modes depending upon their orientation to politics. The authors argued that the
interaction of modes and types enables one to identify the method by which citizens
approach government, as well as the issues that attract them. A multidimensionality
is thus created by measuring the quantity, quality and source of political participation
(1972, pp. 93-94).
Verba and Nie addressed political participation in terms of essentially positive,
conventional activity. Conflict is considered only in the context of zero-sum group
participation, as would occur between political parties in an election campaign (1972,
pp. 50-51, 56-57). Conflict or cleavage is confined to party affiliation or the taking
of a position on an issue. They provide no space in their multidimensional model for
assassination.
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In Participation in Social and Political Activities. David Horton Smith,
Jacqueline Macaulay, and Associates departed from Milbrath and from Verba and Nie
by offering an "unconventional," or negative, form of political participation (1980,
pp. 77, 133-152).
Their "conventional," or normal, participation category more or less reflects
those of Milbrath and Verba and Nie:

voting, discussing politics, campaigning,

attending meetings and rallies, forming a group, contacting government officials, and
belonging to a political party.
"Unconventional" political participation was found to be within the realm of
political activism and included such activities as demonstrating, engaging in civil
disobedience, rioting, engaging in revolutions and rebellions, assassinations and
coups.

Robert W. Hunt and M. Lai Goel, who authored the chapter in Smith

regarding unconventional political participation (1980, pp. 133-152),
... define the dependent variables as follows: Unconventional political
behavior refers to acts of disruption, destruction, and injury within a
political community against the political regime, its actors, or its
politics. This definition includes an exceedingly wide range of
behaviors, from assassinations, to military coups, to less-focused forms
of militant activities by segments of the public at large.
It
encompasses a range of activities from protest, which is aimed at
policy change without challenging the basic authority of policymakers,
to partial and finally total resistance...
(1980, p. 134). They further observed that there is tentativeness and ambiguity in the
research with
... competing and often overlapping paradigms but no verified
comprehensive theories. More limited explanations are plentiful, but
the causal factors discussed are usually not linked systematically; and
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the terms are not defined precisely enough to allow for significant
comparative and cumulative research
(1980, p. 134).
While the authors termed conventional participation "normal and legitimate,"
they acknowledged that societies may define these differently (1980, p. 77).
Smith identified some political factors facilitating unconventional participation
(1980, pp. 137-139). These factors involve regime legitimacy, the ability of a regime
to react to changing conditions, permissiveness/coerciveness of the regime, and the
effectiveness of protest groups.
On an individual level, participation factors include social background,
instinctual human aggressiveness, and attitudinal factors such as frustration and
alienation (1980, pp. 139-149).
Finally, situational factors were brought into the equation (1980, pp. 149-152).
The context for negative participation must exist, such as a dramatic event, contagion
from one group to another or modern technology (availability of weaponry,
transportation, communications). Smith clearly opens the door for looking at some
assassinations/attempts as acts of political participation.

Summary of the Literature

This chapter has provided a view of significant previous studies of the
assassination phenomenon. The research of the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence and the research of James W. Clarke were particularly
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highlighted since the present study is fundamentally based on their conclusions. The
reader should come away with the impression that the National Commission and
Clarke approached the study of assassination very differently.

Moreover, the

difference was reflected in their respective typologies with the National Commission
addressing assassination as an event and with Clarke focusing on the assassin.
Additional sources dealing with assassination and terrorism were presented to
demonstrate that assassination is frequently, hut not always, a technique and tool of
terrorism. These additional writings, which resulted from significant investigations
in their own right, provided areas of agreement and disagreement with the fmdings
of the National Commission and Clarke and broadened the base for this research.
The writings of several leading scholars on political participation were offered
to establish a theoretical framework for examining the phenomenon of assassination
in the context of political participation. Significant differences were found among
these authors; in that certain researchers provided an opening for examining
assassination as a potential act of political participation, while others did not directly
address the idea of negative or unconventional types of political participation at all.
This research proposes a political participation model as illustrated in Figure
1 (next page). Although the reader at first may construe this model as a Milbrath-like
hierarchy, it differs in fundamental ways. Certain activities of lesser efforts can
represent either positive or negative forms of political participation depending upon
how the initial stimulus is received by the participant. Positive and negative forms
of participation can be seen to further diverge at the extremes, but remain dependent
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Figure 1. Individual Political Participation.
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on the effect of the stimulus to determine the direction and degree of effort.
Participants need not ascend from one level to another, although in some persons that
may be the case.

The closer to either extreme a political actor participates, the

greater is the effort required for that participation.
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CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Hypothesis and Research Questions

In 1969, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
reported findings and reached conclusions that permitted the formulation of an
hypothesis about assassinations for this research:
1. There is a relationship between the level of office of the intended victim
and the motive for assassination attempt. The higher the office of the victim, the
more impersonal and political the motive for assassination; and the lower the level of
office of the victim, the more personal and less political the motive for assassination.
The following additional research questions were posed in the present study:
1. Are there any changes in the frequency of presidential assassinations/
attempts?
2. Can any macro or micro trends in assassination venues be identified?
3. Is there any common assassination method?
4. Are there any differences in mortality of assassinations?
5.

Do the data support including assassination as an act of political

participation?

35
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6.

Do the data support the typologies developed by the National Commission

and/or James W. Clarke?

Underlying Design

This study is designed to examine the phenomenon of assassination in the
United States from 1969 through 1992 via the use of descriptive case studies. This
most recent data is compiled to challenge previous hypotheses and typologies.
The research consists of case studies and is non-experimental and unobtrusive.
Assassinations/attempts occurring in the United States during the above-cited period
forms the unit of analysis. Presidential assassinations are considered separately from
non-presidential assassinations, but they are also compared. There is no feasible
control group for this study.
The variables include the date of the assassination/attempt, the victim and
his/her political role, the location by city, the method and result of the attack, and the
assailant and his/her/their motive, if known. These variables are used to order the
narrative form for each case, and then the data for each variable are charted onto
appropriate tables. Tables 1 and 2, pages 69 and 71 respectively, present the data for
presidential assassinations and Tables 3 and 4, pages 82 and 84 respectively, for nonpresidential assassinations.
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Sampling and Data Collection

The sample consists of the entire population of assassination events which
occurred during the selected time period. Since the entire population of such events
is being considered, there is no place for the use of inferential statistics.
A list of assassinations/attempts occurring from 1969 through 1992, which
fulfilled definitional parameters, was compiled.

To ensure construct validity the

details of each event was triangulated via multiple data sources, which included
encyclopedias of assassination, murder, political violence and terrorism, as well as
the database of Lexis/Nexis. Since media accounts may contain inaccuracies due to
reporting or editorial time constraints, that information was in turn triangulated with
other media sources contained in Nexis.
It should be noted that the National Commission, given the far greater length
of its study period, was able to sample assassination events that included officials at
varying levels, e.g., U.S. senators, congressmen, governors, etc. This study, using
a shorter time period, can only make the distinction between presidential and nonpresidential assassinations. Because of the lack of representation in some levels, the
non-presidential events are not subdivided hierarchically, although the positions of the
officeholders are noted.
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Concepts and Operational Definitions

The following operational definitions were used to define the independent
variables:
The victim is defined as the intended target of the assassination. Bystanders
wounded or killed were not included as a variable, although those persons are
acknowledged.
The method is defined as the weapon of assassination.

The case study

narratives explain the technique used for employing the weapon.
The result focused on the intended victim. Ancillary victims were not reported
under this variable.
The venue of an assassination identified the city and state where the attack
occurred.
The assailant is defined as the person or persons planning, supporting and/or
carrying out the attack. For instance, in a contract killing the person who ordered or
contracted the attack is listed as an assailant. A driver of a getaway car is likewise
considered an assailant.
The motive identified the stated or discovered reasons that the victim was
targeted.
The following terms are used frequently in the case studies and analysis:
Assassination is the extralegal homicide or attempted homicide directed at a
specific officeholder, candidate for office, or an individual in public political life.
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Excluded as attempts are verbal or written threats, stalking of intended victims or
aggressive mass demonstrations.

These behaviors, where, applicable may be

considered as threshold acts to assassinations rather than as assassination events in
themselves. This will also apply to cases in which the assassin initially stalks one
target before assaulting another. Each case study in this thesis is considered a single
assassination event although it may have resulted in multiple casualties.
Without wishing to be unduly redundant, I would like to present two more
historical events to illustrate the definitional limitations used in this report. When
Guiseppe Zangara attempted to assassinate Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami, he missed
shooting the President, but did shoot and kill Anton Cermak, the Mayor of Chicago
who accompanied the President.

This study would define the event as an

assassination attempt against the President and the murder, but not the assassination
of Mayor Cermak. The mayor was not a specific target of the assassination and thus
would be considered a bystander victim. This would also be true of the wounding
of Governor John Connally during the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
Terrorism is the use or threat of use of force to instill fear. It is generally
distinctive from assassination in that human victims of terrorism are often random and
unspecific.
To be considered an individual in political public life, one must be an
officeholder and/or publicly known for his/her political views. This enables this
investigation to consider some non-officeholders as assassination targets.
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A psychotic person suffers a serious mental disorder in which thought
processes are so severely impaired that the individual cannot distinguish reality from
that which is not real.
A neurotic person is one who can discern reality, but suffers an impairment
of a portion of their personality.
Personality disorders are a set of emotional impairments that manifest in
depression, antisocial behavior, violence, suicide, and are often accompanied by
substance abuse. A disorder affects all areas of a subject’s life, although the sufferer
may be untroubled by the illness because of poor insight. Personality disorders are
typed as antisocial personality disorder (commonly known as psychopath or
sociopath), narcissistic personality disorder (grandiose sense of self), borderline
personality disorder (transient between neurotic and psychotic) and passive-aggressive
personality disorder (unable to maintain emotional equilibrium).
To be sure, the very brief psychiatric definitions lack medical precision, but
are intended to furnish the reader with a rough recognition of the terms.

Since

presidential assassinations are invariably diagnosed, these terms appear in the
presidential case studies. The absence of psychiatric terms in non-presidential case
studies should not lead to any inferences other than the greater scrutiny and
information available on presidential assassins.
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CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDIES - PRESIDENTIAL

Arthur Herman Bremer

Xhfi_Assault
On May 15, 1972, in Laurel, Maryland, Arthur Herman Bremer shot and
wounded Presidential Candidate George C. Wallace, Governor of Alabama.
On that day Governor Wallace attended an outdoor political rally, which was
held in a shopping center parking lot. Affording candidates protection during the
campaign, a Secret Service advance team had established security perimeters adjacent
to the speaker’s platform and contiguous areas of ingress and egress. A bullet-proof
podium had also been provided.

The crowds were thus restrained by ropeline

barricades and there was nothing otherwise to indicate any problems. In short, the
site was considered by the advance agents to be as secure as reasonably possible.
Arthur Bremer stood in the second tier of spectators behind the ropeline.
Witnesses reported that he exhibited no overt signs of his intention to shoot the
governor. He kept his .38 caliber revolver concealed until immediately prior to the
assault. In this manner he was able to accomplish his mission at point-blank range
and fire all five shots within three to four seconds.

41
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The Intended Victim

George C. Wallace, the Governor of Alabama, became a candidate for
President of the United States for the second time in 1972. After a schism within the
Democratic Party in 1968, Governor Wallace mounted a third-party campaign,
forming the American Independent Party. For his efforts he succeeded in garnering
13.5% of the popular vote and it was this that he used for his springboard in the 1972
Presidential Campaign. He was, by most accounts, a controversial candidate based
on his record as a segregationist southern governor and his break from the Democratic
Party.
His political and social views more often than not resulted in sharp encounters
between the pro and anti forces who commonly attended his rallies. And Governor
Wallace developed a penchant for making impromptu approaches to crowds he
perceived as friendly for purposes of personal greeting and hand-shaking. It should
be noted that Governor Wallace had been warned by the Secret Service of the
potential hazards of his campaign style. After the assault, he publicly acknowledged
receiving this warning. So there developed a deadly scenario in which a campaign
style dovetailed with the determined intention of an individual to do harm.
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The Assassin

Arthur Herman Bremer was bom on August 21, 1950, at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. At the time of his assault he stood 5 feet 6 inches, weighed 145 pounds,
with blue eyes and blond hair. He is white. Arthur was thought by family members
to be intelligent, but he was only an average student. He graduated from high school
and held a succession of odd jobs, none permanently. He was described as a loner
and had no friends. In 1971 he attempted to establish a relationship with a fifteenyear-old girl, but the relationship was terminated within a few weeks at her request.
There is no evidence that he ever had a successful association with anyone of the
opposite sex.
His problems with interpersonal relationships apparently extended from his
family life. He was upset over his father’s drinking and the alleged bad marriage of
his parents. He described his home as being dirty and unkept.
In January 1971, coinciding with the break-up with his one and only
girlfriend, Arthur Bremer purchased a .38 caliber revolver from Casanova Guns in
Milwaukee.
It was in the following year that Bremer first revealed his intention to
assassinate in a diary he kept from March 2, 1972, to April 3, 1972. He began by
noting, "Now I start my diaiy of my personal plot to kill by pistol either Richard
Nixon or George Wallace. I intend to shoot one or the other while he attends a
champange (sic) rally for Wisconsin Presidential Primary.n
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On April 14 and 15, President Nixon traveled to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada for
a state visit. Arthur Bremer likewise traveled to Ottawa and stalked the President in
an effort to gain close enough access for an assassination attempt.

Bremer was

frustrated by the tightness of the joint Canadian and American security and thus
postponed his plan. He briefly considered shooting Secret Service agents, but decided
that the publicity value was minimal. (Ed. Note: As an anecdotal observation, on
that occasion I worked in close proximity to President Nixon as an agent of the Secret
Service, Presidential Protective Division. I had the opportunity on several subsequent
occasions to discuss Mr. Bremer’s revelations with my colleagues who also worked
that visit. We particularly noted that the Canadians were very security sensitive
because of an unarmed assault against Soviet Premier Kosygin during a previous visit
to Canada. In that incident, spectators had been permitted in rather close proximity
to Mr. Kosygin and an individual bolted from the crowd and tackled the Soviet
Premier around the neck and wrestled him to the ground before security elements
could react. Canadian security officials, deeply embarrassed by that incident, were
determined that it would not be repeated.

Therefore, Arthur Bremer found the

security to be formidable with crowds kept at a distance. In those discussions, we
concluded that he had little or no real opportunity for a meaningful assassination
attempt during the President’s visit to Canada.)
Arthur Bremer’s stalking behavior did not end there.

He redirected his

attention and interest toward Governor Wallace, whom he perceived as an easier
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target. He stalked George Wallace in Michigan (including Kalamazoo), New York
and Maryland.

Ihg-Rg&uU
As Governor Wallace concluded his speech on May 15, 1972, at Laurel,
Maryland, he stepped from behind his bullet-proof podium and, instead of proceeding
to the motorcade to the rear of the stage, he approached the crowd in front. As he
reached to shake hands in proximity of Arthur Bremer, Bremer fired his shots in rapid
succession. Special Agent in Charge Jimmy Taylor threw his raincoat in Bremer’s
face to obstruct his view, but the damage had already been done. Of five shots fired,
Governor Wallace had been struck three times. Also wounded were Secret Service
Special Agent Nicholas Zarvos, Alabama State Trooper Captain William Dothard and
a woman spectator. Arthur Bremer was subdued and as he was being led away by
police, he asked the officers if they wished his autograph.
Governor Wallace never fully recovered from his wounds. A bullet wound
to his abdomen had also damaged his spinal cord and he remains a paraplegic to this
day. Governor Wallace has experienced several medical set-backs and complications
through the years because of the injuries and some, the most recent in mid-1992, have
been life threatening.
The other three persons wounded in the assault recovered, although Special
Agent Zarvos suffered partial paralysis of his vocal cords from being shot in the
throat.
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A subsequent search of Bremer’s Milwaukee apartment turned up mostly
rambling and incoherent writings.

But among items found were a list of state

primaries and the notation, "How to do a bang-up job of getting people to notice
you."
In subsequent interviews, he was ambivalent about the shooting. He felt that
the three persons wounded with Governor Wallace were innocent bystanders who
happened to get in the way.
Arthur Herman Bremer was prosecuted by the State of Maryland, which had
jurisdiction for this offense.

Mental health professionals testifying at his trial

disagreed about his legal sanity. There were indications of personality disorder and
possible schizophrenia, paranoid type. He experienced both suicidal and homicidal
ideations. He was found guilty of attempted murder and remains incarcerated in the
Maryland corrections system.

Samuel Joseph Byck

The Assault

On February 22, 1974, in Baltimore, Maryland, Samuel Joseph Byck
attempted to hijack a Delta Airlines jet at the Baltimore Washington Airport with the
expressed purpose of crashing it into the White House and killing President Nixon.
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As passengers boarded a Delta flight scheduled to travel to Atlanta, Samuel
Byck forcibly boarded the airplane by first shooting a security guard with a .22
caliber handgun. He also carried an explosive device in a briefcase.
He fired a warning shot inside the airplane and ordered the pilot to get the
craft airborne. As he ordered the doors closed, the flight attendants escaped. When
the pilot attempted to explain to Byck the physical procedures for getting underway,
Byck shot the co-pilot in the abdomen. When he unsuccessfully attempted to get a
passenger to serve as a co-pilot, Byck shot the co-pilot in the head and the pilot in the
shoulder. Before losing consciousness, the pilot radioed the tower and advised of the
emergency.
Byck then reloaded his gun and shot the pilot and co-pilot each once again.
At that time the police, who had taken positions outside the aircraft, fired three
gunshots at Byck, striking him twice. As he laid wounded on the floor, he turned his
own gun to his head and committed suicide.

The Intended Victim

Richard Nixon had been President of the United States since 1968. On that
day, February 22, 1974, his administration was in the midst of the Watergate scandal
and, as we know from history, was in the final months of his presidency.
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The Assassin

Samuel Joseph Byck was bom on Januaiy 30, 1930, at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. At the time of his assault, he stood 5 feet 9 inches, weighed 225
pounds, with brown eyes and brown hair. He was white. Byck attended high school,
but did not graduate. He served in the U.S. Army from April 1954 to April 1956,
receiving an honorable discharge. While in the service, he received standard military
weapons training, but no specialized training.
His arrest history included larceny, fraud and receiving stolen goods. He had
no history of crimes of violence.
In 1957, he married. After his discharge from the army, he attempted several
business ventures, all of which failed. By 1968, his marriage collapsed, followed
shortly thereafter by the commencement of treatment for mental illness.
He experienced periodic psychiatric hospitalizations from 1969 to 1973. He
was diagnosed as manic depressive (now called bipolar personality disorder), but there
was nothing in his pathology to indicate that he was dangerous.
Samuel Byck came to the attention of the Secret Service in October 1972,
when his father-in-law reported that he remarked that someone should kill President
Nixon. Byck denied the statement in an interview with Secret Service agents. In
January, 1973, Byck’s wife and sister-in-law reported that they had read threats
against President Nixon in his diary. Byck again denied the threats. By this time the
Secret Service had developed a continuing interest in Samuel Byck. In September,
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1973, Byck began picketing on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House.
There was no violent behavior or rhetoric associated with the picketing, in which he
periodically indulged until February 4, 1974.
It was at this time that he began keeping his diary in the format of tape
recordings. In a tape dated February 21, 1974, Byck described a plan he labeled
"Operation Pandora’s Box:"
I will by to get the plan aloft and fly it towards the target area, which
will be Washington, D .C ., the capitol of the most powerful, wealthiest
nation of the world. By guise, threats or trickery, I hope to force the
pilot to buzz the White House. When the plane is in this position, I
will shoot the pilot and then in the last few minutes try to steer the
plane into the target, which is the White House. Whoever dies in
Project Pandora’s Box will be directly attributable to the Watergate
scandals.

The Result
As one can readily observe, "Operation Pandora’s Box" was a rather elaborate
plan that failed early in its execution. Had Byck succeeded in getting airborne, his
chance of success is academic. But it is clear that the potential for disaster extended
significantly beyond the danger to the President.
Although Samuel Byck failed to employ the aircraft as a weapon, he never
theless did significant damage with his intermediate weapon, a handgun.

Before

taking his own life, Byck shot to death a Baltimore Washington Airport security
guard. Both the pilot, who survived, and the co-pilot, who did not, of the Delta
Airlines flight received multiple gunshot wounds.
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Lynette Alice Fromme

The Assault

On September 5, 1975, in Sacramento, California, Lynette Alice Fromme
attempted to shoot Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States.
On that day President Ford paid an official visit to Sacramento.

After

attending an earlier meeting, he walked with members of his staff and Secret Service
detail through a public park adjacent to the state capital building, where he had a
meeting scheduled with Governor Jeny Brown.
There were members of the public in the park at the time. The decision to
walk rather than ride in the armored presidential limousine was made impromptu and
the park had not been secured in advance. As a result, the President was approached
by persons wishing to shake hands, which he accommodated. In this manner, Lynette
Fromme approached within arm’s length of the President. She wore a long, red robe
which concealed a .45 caliber automatic pistol in a holster strapped to her leg.
As she brought the gun from concealment and pointed it at President Ford, the
Secret Service agents reacted. One agent grabbed the pistol from Fromme’s hand as
he subdued her. Other agents covered and evacuated President Ford to a place of
safety. As Fromme was being subdued and arrested, she said, "It didn’t go off! Can
you believe it? It didn’t go off! Why are you protecting him? He’s not a public
servant!"
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The Intended Victim

Gerald R. Ford became President of the United States upon the resignation of
Richard Nixon in August, 1974. He had been a congressman from Michigan and a
member of the congressional leadership prior to his appointment by President Nixon
to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew. Mr. Ford
was generally considered to be popular among his political colleagues and was
considered to be a non-controversial choice in filling the vice presidential vacancy;
and, except for the pardon of the resigned President Nixon, President Ford was
relatively non-controversial as the Chief Executive. He was viewed by many as a
"caretaker" president, there to administer the office until the next election. As an
interesting digression, it should be noted that as a congressman Mr. Ford was a
member of the Warren Commission that investigated the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy.

The As§as?in
Lynette Alice Fromme was born on October 22, 1948, at Santa Monica,
California. At the time of her assault, she stood 5 feet, weighed 115 pounds, with
hazel eyes and red hair. She is white.
She attended college, but did not complete the requirements for a degree. It
was during this period that her life underwent some profound and lasting changes.
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Her relationship with her parents deteriorated to the point that, in 1967, she was no
longer welcome in her parents’ home. Her contact with them thereafter was minimal.
She also had a history of psychiatric treatment dating from 1966 and stemming
from two suicide attempts.
It was then that she met Charles Manson, a cult figure, who was known to
exploit the fragile emotions of persons in Ms. Fromme’s predicament.

With

Manson’s persuasion and support, Fromme became a member of what was to be
known as the Manson Family. Manson even gave Fromme the nickname Squeaky
because of qualities in her voice.
As it was later demonstrated, the Manson Family freely indulged in drugs, sex
and crime, certainly the most notorious being the so-called Tate-LaBianca homicides.
Although Fromme was a full and enthusiastic participant within the Manson Family,
she was not believed to be involved in the Tate-LaBianca episode.

Since those

murders, however, were apparently part of a theory of revolution called Helter
Skelter, proposed by Manson, Fromme’s knowledge of those crimes has long been
suspected.
When Charles Manson and others were ultimately arrested and tried for the
Tate-LaBianca murders, Fromme and other Manson Family members not arrested
maintained a high profile in the courtroom by appearing with shaved heads and the
letter "X" carved into their respective foreheads. Their demonstrations were intended
as a statement of Manson’s (as well as the other defendants’) innocence. Even after
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Manson’s conviction and imprisonment in 1971, most Family members, including
Fromme, still identified with Manson.
Fromme resided with Sandra Good, another Manson Family member, in
Sacramento. Together they continued attempts to gain the release of Charles Manson.
Those attempts most often consisted of threats of violence.
By 1975 Fromme and Good had contacted many business and news media
sources and warned of violence if Manson was not released from prison.

In an

August 1975 letter to NBC, Fromme threatened in part,
... will Tate-LaBianca murders need to be repeated to tell the truth of
the thoughts we have been raised into ... if Nixon’s reality wearing a
Ford face continues to run this country against the law without any
real truth, trust or faith, if Manson is not allowed to explain what you
. are too sheltered to face, your houses will be bloodier than the TateLaBianca houses and My Lai (ed: reference to massacre in Viet Nam
War) put together.
Fromme reportedly had been involved with other Manson Family members in
compiling a list of business executives to be murdered. She was also named as a
leader of discussions with other Family members held in late 1974 and early 1975
regarding the feasibility of assassinating former President Nixon, California Governor
Brown and Vincent Bugliosi (prosecutor in the Manson trial).

The Result

In preparing her assassination attempt, Lynette Fromme neglected to place a
bullet in the gun’s chamber, although the magazine she placed into the gun was fully
loaded. By not chambering a round, to use shooters’ jargon, the pistol was not ready
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to fire. Before she could accomplish that maneuver, the gun was taken from her by
the Secret Service agent. Had the gun been in the proper condition to fire, it is quite
likely that she could have fired at least one shot and perhaps more, and she stood at
point blank range. To the President’s good fortune, it appears that assassin Fromme’s
familiarity with her weapon was insufficient.
Lynette Alice Fromme was arrested as she made the attempt on President
Ford’s Life. In subsequent searches of her car and residence, clippings of newspaper
and magazine articles concerning President Ford and other political leaders were
found.

Also found were letters from Charles Manson expounding his various

"philosophies."
Fromme made repeated attempts to disrupt her trial at which she denied that
she had intended to shoot President Ford. Her assertion was that her attempt and
subsequent trial were designed to draw attention to the plight of Charles Manson and
gain a new trial for him. The connection of this attempt symbolically with Charles
Manson is certainly plausible, but her argument that she intended no harm to
President Ford is unconvincing. She interestingly cited her exclamation, "It didn’t
go off!" and her subsequent utterances as proof of her lack of intent to shoot the
President.

The United States Attorney cited the same exclamation as the

prosecution’s proof of her harmful intent. On November 26, 1975, Lynette Fromme
was found guilty of a violation of attempting to assassinate the President under Title
18, United States Code, Section 1751. On December 17, 1975, she was sentenced
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to life imprisonment and remains in the federal correctional system. She is still
devoted to Charles Manson.
President Ford survived this attack only to be attacked two and a half weeks
later by another woman.

Sara Jane Moore

The Assault

On September 22, 1975, in San Francisco, California, Sara Jane Moore fired
a shot at President Gerald R. Ford.
President Ford had just delivered a speech to the World Affairs Council at a
meeting at the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco. As he emerged, accompanied by
members of his Secret Service detail, Sara Moore fired a single shot from a .38
caliber handgun at a distance of approximately 40 feet.
As a scheduled "on-the-record" event, the meeting site attended by the
President had been surveyed and secured by the Secret Service and the San Francisco
Police Department prior to his visit. The secured perimeters included certain outdoor
areas adjacent to the hotel entrance where the motorcade was positioned. Ropeline
barricades had been erected in anticipation of crowds gathering to see the President.
In part because of the attempt on his life just two weeks prior, crowds were not
allowed in any close proximity to the President.
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Sara Moore stood within the crowd area across the street from the hotel
entrance, whence she made her attempt. No one in her proximity discerned any sign
of her intentions.

As President Ford emerged from the hotel, Moore drew the

revolver from her purse, took aim and fired one shot.

The Intended Victim

Of considerable significance surrounding this event was President Ford’s
survival of an assassination attempt on September 5, 1975, just eighteen days prior
to this attack.

It also bears repeating that he was not considered a symbol of

controversy and in fact enjoyed a public image of a likeable person.

The Assassin

She was born Sara Jane Kahn on February 15, 1930, at Charleston, West
Virginia. At the time of her assault she stood 5 feet 3 inches, weighed 120 pounds,
with hazel eyes and brown hair. She is white.
Sara Kahn experienced a somewhat troubled adolescence, punctuated by a
runaway from home for a short time while in her teens. After graduating from high
school, she entered a nursing school from which she was expelled before completing
one year.
It was during that time, 1947 to 1949, that she began receiving psychiatric
treatment. She was diagnosed with emotional instability reaction based on several
suicide attempts. She suffered from depression and received hospital treatment.
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She enlisted in the Women’s Army Corps in January, 1949, and it was at this
time that she commenced with a series of unsuccessful marriages. Her first marriage
was to an enlisted man in the Marine Corps. In 1950, she was discharged from the
WACS as unsuitable for military service, roughly coinciding with the dissolution of
her first marriage.
Three of her four children were born during her second marriage, that to a
commissioned officer in the Air Force. At the breakup of that marriage, she sent her
children to live with her parents. She maintained an estrangement from those children
and her parents to the time of the assassination attempt.
She gave birth to her fourth child during her third marriage, which likewise
failed. Her fourth and final marriage was annulled in 1973, because she had failed
to divorce her third husband.
At this time she began using the last name Moore, which was her mother’s
maiden name. She briefly worked as a bookkeeper, but as was the pattern of her life,
she was unable to establish permanency.
She then began an association with San Francisco radical political causes. She
also became an informant for the local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Curiously, she was careless about concealing that fact to the persons on whom she
was informing. As a result, she reported threats on her life. She therefore purchased
a .44 caliber handgun with which she practiced and became familiar.
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Her emotional in stab ility continued. She had been examined in the mid and
late 1980s and diagnosed as passive aggressive personality disorder and acutely
depressed.
With this as a backdrop, Sara Moore increased her involvement in political
intrigue. Her involvement became so entangled that she claimed friendships with
persons in the ultra-radical New World Liberation Front and the Red Guerilla Family.
She was in fact suspected of supplying the Red Guerilla Family with a floor plan
sketch of the San Francisco FBI office gained from her visits there. That office was
damaged from a bombing.
After two friends in the radical underground movement were killed by police
in June, 1975, and after Patricia Hurst, as a member of the Symbionese Liberation
Army, was arrested on September 18, 1975, Moore expressed fear of being wrongly
identified by radicals as the informant in those cases.
On September 20,1975, amid publicity surrounding President Ford’s pending
visit to San Francisco, Sara Moore advised the San Francisco Police Department that
she intended to test the system. Police authorities interpreted that cryptic statement
to mean a test of the security surrounding the President.

Her handgun was

confiscated and the Secret Service was notified.
On September 21, 1975, Moore was interviewed by two Secret Service agents.
She denied any threat against the President and said that she meant to test the system
by participating in a demonstration, possibly while carrying a gun. Further, she
claimed that her statements were misinterpreted and that the gun was for her own
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personal protection. The Secret Service agents had no cause to arrest or further
detain Moore or reason to doubt the authenticity of her explanation.
On September 22,1975, Sara Moore locally purchased a .38 caliber revolver.

The Result

At the time the shot was fired. President Ford was waving to the crowd. He
was partially concealed from spectators by the limousine and by the Secret Service
agents on either side of him.

It should be noted here that President Ford often

approached such crowds for personal greeting and handshakes. However, in light of
the recent attempt on his life, the President tempered his inclination to do this,
possibly saving his life.
The bullet struck a wall behind and to one side of the President, ricocheted
and struck a taxi driver bystander several yards away. He was not seriously injured.
The Secret Service agents rushed the President into the relative safety of the
armored limousine and evacuated from the scene.
The .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver was discovered to be improperly
sighted, which caused Moore’s shot to pass high and to the right as she faced her
target. Since Moore had purchased the gun that day and was literally loading it on
the drive to the St. Francis Hotel, she had no opportunity to familiarize herself with
the weapon and to correct or compensate for the sighting misadjustment. As a matter
of fact, Moore later opined that she would have hit her target had she used the gun
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confiscated by the police. Given the relatively short shooting distance of forty feet,
her claim had some merit.
At this point it would be useful to examine certain paradoxes in the statements
given by Sara Jane Moore. As she described in subsequent interviews, her plan was
to stand behind the crowd. She said that at the opportune time she would fire one
aimed shot, then drop the weapon. In the confusion and chaos that was certain to
follow, she planned to escape and watch the news of the assassination on television.
At the same time she reported hoping to be captured.
In revealing her motive for the attack, Moore said that the dichotomy of being
an informant and becoming more deeply involved within radical groups caused her
extreme ambivalence. And as her involvement deepened, she participated in several
group discussions of possible targets for assassinations. It is noteworthy that Moore
proclaimed assassination as an appropriate method of political change. She said that
it was particularly appropriate for governments that condoned assassination, e.g., the
United States. To this end she expressed the belief that her attempt forced the United
States Government to change its policy and oppose the use of assassination.
She identified as the threshold event in her decision to assassinate President
Ford the interview by the Secret Service on September 21, 1975. Realizing that she
had come to the attention of the Secret Service, she decided to act immediately. She
felt that as more was discovered about her, she would be placed under surveillance
and lose the opportunity.
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Moore said that she was actually able to carry out her attempt by directing her
thoughts to the office rather than the officeholder. In that way she could kill the
President, but not Gerald Ford personally.
Sara Jane Moore was subdued by persons in the crowd after firing one shot.
She was arrested by the Secret Service and charged with attempting to kill the
President under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1751. After her arrest Moore
was found to be sane in the legal sense and not psychotic.

She was diagnosed

emotionally disturbed with narcissistic personality disorder. She was also found to
be paranoid and compulsive.

On December 16, 1975, she pled guilty, and on

January 15, 1976, she was sentenced to life imprisonment.

She is currently

incarcerated in the federal correctional system.

John Wamock Hinckley

The Assault

On March 30, 1981, in Washington, D.C., John Wamock Hinckley shot and
wounded President Ronald Reagan.
The assault occurred after President Reagan had addressed a luncheon group
and was departing the Washington Hilton Hotel. As the President exited the hotel
accompanied by members of his staff and Secret Service agents, Hinckley rapidly
fired six shots from a .22 caliber revolver from a distance of approximately 15 feet.
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Portions of the Washington Hilton Hotel had been surveyed and secured in
advance by agents of the Secret Service and officers of the Washington Metropolitan
Police Department. Outside the hotel, which was where the attempt took place, a
roped area for public and press had been erected on the sidewalk to one side of the
secondary hotel exit which was intended to be used by the President. Since the event
attended by the President was not open to the general public with announced arrival
and departure times, spectator numbers were expected to be minimal. At the time of
the actual visit, crowd numbers were in fact as anticipated. The level of security was
considered commensurate with the number of spectators.
This event was listed on the President’s daily schedule, which was published
in the Washington Star newspaper. This was in fact Hinckley’s source in learning the
President’s itinerary.
John Hinckley stood among a small number of press and public at the sidewalk
ropeline. As President Reagan emerged, Hinckley took out the revolver, which he
had kept concealed, and rapidly fired all six rounds from his revolver.

The Intended Victim

When Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, he
was the oldest person ever elected to that office. He was inaugurated in January,
1981, and was in the very early days of his administration at the time of the assault.
One could argue that he was in the so-called "honeymoon" period of his
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administration and enjoying that relative popularity. There were no real controversies
involving him or his administration at that time.

The Assassin

John Wamock Hinckley was born on May 29, 1955, at Ardmore, Oklahoma.
At the time of his assault he stood 5 feet 9 inches, weighed 180 pounds, with blue
eyes and blond hair. He is white.
For most of his life prior to the assassination attempt, Hinckley resided with
his father, mother, brother and sister in the area of Denver, Colorado. He grew to
communicate very little with his family and spent much of his time alone. He had
no friends, male or female.
After graduating from high school, he enrolled in college in Texas, but
dropped out after about two and a half years.
occupational direction.

He had no real academic or

He fancied himself a songwriter and went to California,

where he unsuccessfully attempted to sell his songs.
He supported himself on odd jobs and contributions from his parents while he
resided in Texas. It was in 1979 when Hinckley began purchasing guns. It was
during this time that he also purchased the exploding Devastator brand bullets he used
in his assault on President Reagan.
In 1976, he first viewed the movie "Taxi Driver" in which the actress Jodie
Foster starred as a teenage prostitute. Hinckley viewed the film on several occasions
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and developed an obsessive love interest in the actress. It was this obsession that
would provide the catalyst for his attempt on the President.
During this period Hinckley also expressed interest in white supremacist and
anti-Semitic groups such as the National Socialist Party of America.

He also

developed a fascination with the assassination of President Kennedy and the attempt
on Governor Wallace. Hinckley was known to have been personally devastated by
the murder in late 1980 of ex-Beatle John Lennon, which he claimed to be a threshold
event in his decision to shoot the President.
Yet it would appear that Hinckley had made his decision much earlier. In
September, 1980, Hinckley traveled to Yale University, where Jodie Foster was
enrolled as a student. He had convinced his parent that he wished to attend Yale and
he received some financial assistance from them for that purpose. He talked to Jodie
Foster at least twice on the telephone, but he was spumed in his attempts to establish
any relationship with her.
On October 9 and 10, 1980, he stalked President Jimmy Carter in Dayton,
Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee.

In Nashville, he apparently attempted to gain

proximity to the President but was discouraged by the mass of the crowd between
him and his objective. Interestingly, as he was preparing to board a flight departing
Nashville, three handguns, ammunition, and a pair of handcuffs were detected in his
luggage. He was arrested for carrying concealed weapons, fined, and released. It
should be noted that Hinckley’s connection with President Carter’s visit was not
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readily apparent to authorities since Hinckley was departing Nashville when the
weapons were detected.
In November and December, 1980, Hinckley traveled to Washington, D.C.,
where he stalked President-elect Reagan. On several occasions he stood across the
street from the Blair House, where the President-elect temporarily resided. One time
Hinckley waited at the Mayflower Hotel, where the President-elect was to attend an
event, but canceled.
Hinckley then traveled to New York City, where he participated in a vigil in
Central Park in connection with the John Lennon murder. He was in deep despair
over Lennon’s death and stayed in New York until February, 1981.
As he returned to Washington in February, 1981, he went to the office of
Senator Edward Kennedy, where he unsuccessfully attempted to speak to the senator
in person. His intentions on that occasion are not known.

The Result

As President Reagan emerged from the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30,
1981, Hinckley waited in the midst of a small crowd gathered at the sidewalk
ropeline. He fired his shots virtually as fast as his finger could pull the trigger. Of
six shots fired, one bullet struck Press Secretary James Brady in the forehead, one
struck Metropolitan Police Officer Thomas Delahanty in the neck and one struck
Secret Service agent Timothy McCarthy in the abdomen. The bullet that struck
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President Reagan first ricocheted off the limousine expending some of its explosive
energy (remember, Hinckley used an exploding bullet).
President Reagan was pushed into the car by Special Agent in Charge Jerry
Paar. As they evacuated, it was discovered that President Reagan had been wounded.
He was rushed to George Washington University Hospital, where he underwent
surgery to extract a bullet lodged near his heart. It was feared by some that the
President’s age might inhibit his recovery, but history shows that not to be the case.
President Reagan made a full recovery, served two presidential terms, and is healthy
in retirement.
Presidential Press Secretary Brady was brain-injured and his recovery was
incomplete.
Officer Delahanty recovered insufficiently from his wound to continue with
the Metropolitan Police Department. He retired on disability.
Special Agent McCarthy recovered from a severe abdominal wound and
continued his career in the Secret Service.
A search of Hinckley’s room at the Park Central Hotel in Washington revealed
an unmailed letter to Jodie Foster in which he stated his intention to kill President
Reagan to gain her attention.
Additional searches of Hinckley’s vehicle and his room at his parents’ home
revealed several pertinent items. Ammunition and used targets were recovered as
well as a photograph depicting Hinckley pointing a revolver at his own head. There
were books, magazines and newspaper articles concerning President Reagan, the
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assassination of President Kennedy, the attempted assassination of Governor Wallace,
the murder of John Lennon and the death of Elvis Presley.
As Hinckley was completing his assault. Secret Service agents subdued and
arrested him. He was charged with attempting to assassinate the President under Title
18, United States Code, Section 1751, and with assaulting a federal officer under
Section 111 of the same criminal code.
A psychiatric evaluation was ordered and he was diagnosed with borderline
personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder and depression.
He was eventually found competent to stand trial, which was held from May
4 through June 21, 1982. The issue of the trial was not his commission of the
assault, but his mental state at the time.

He was found not guilty by reason of

insanity and committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he
remains.

Summary o f Presidential Assassination Events

From 1969 through 1992, five men occupied the office of President of the
United States spanning virtually six full presidential terms.

During this period

approximately three dozen men and women ran as serious major-party or viable thirdparty aspirants to that highest office. There occurred rive attempted assassinations,
four directed against incumbent presidents and one against a presidential candidate.
Tables 1 and 2 reflect these attacks chronologically and appear on pages 69 and 71.
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President Gerald R. Ford has the dubious distinction of being the only
president in history thus far to suffer more than one attempt against his life. Those
attempts in 1975 happened in a span of less than three weeks and the second was
found not to be a copycat incident.

Of the five presidents serving through the

research period, only Jimmy Carter and George Bush avoided attack. However, since
John Hinckley was known to have stalked President Carter before shooting President
Reagan, and President Bush was stalked by Deborah Butler (see Prologue), their
avoidance of an assault appears to be a matter of happenstance.
Of the five presidential assassination events, four occurred in connection with
public events at which the victim appeared. Only President Nixon was intended to
be attacked in the White House. And in connection with the assaults at public events,
all occurred as the victim was in movement departing the event.
The city venues offer a more mixed view. In two of the attempts (Wallace
and Reagan), the assassin traveled inter-city to their victims. Arthur Bremer in fact
traveled to several cities (including Kalamazoo) in his stalking of Governor Wallace.
In the two attempts against President Ford, the victim traveled to the cities where the
respective assassins resided.
The four presidents attacked were Republicans, although Hinckley initially
stalked Jimmy Carter, a Democrat. The presidential candidate target was a thirdparty independent (and formerly a Democrat), although his assailant initially stalked
a Republican President. Since Republicans dominated the presidency during this
study, and target changes were made by two assassins (Bremer and Hinckley), party
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69
affiliation is not a relevant factor supportable by the data. Significant commonalties
such as political philosophy, policies or surrounding controversy could not be found
among the victims. Ironically, President Ford, the only president to experience two
attacks, enjoyed a generally amiable public image.
All five presidential assailants were diagnosed as suffering from emotional
disorders and all were deemed to have used the act of assassination as an attentionseeking device. However, this commonalty was manifested in motives unique to each
of the individuals. The respective president or candidate was clearly a symbolic
target of each of the five assassins. The assaults were attempts to attract public
attention to their issues not at all related directly to the presidency.

Table 1
Victim - Method - Result - Venue: U.S. Assassination/
Attempts (Presidential)

Date

Victim

Method/Result

Venue

5/12/72

George C. Wallace,
Governor of Alabama
Presidential candidate

Handgun/
Shot and wounded
survived

Laurel,
Maryland/
outdoor

2/22/74

Richard Nixon
President

Suicide attack with
airplane/thwarted
before take-off,
President unharmed

Baltimore,
Maryland &
Washington, DC/
indoor

9/5/75

Gerald Ford.
President

Handgun/gun seized
before tiring,
President unharmed

Sacramento.
California/
outdoor
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Table 1-continued

Date

Victim

Method/Result

Venue

9/22/75

Gerald Ford,
President

Handgun/Shot fired.
missed target,
President unharmed

San Francisco,
California/
outdoor

3/30/81

Ronald Reagan
President

Handgun/
Shot and wounded.
survived

Washington, DC/
outdoor
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Table 2
Assailant - Motive: U.S. Assassinations/
Attempts (Presidential)

Event

Assailant

Motive

5/12/72
Wallace

Arthur Herman Bremer

Seeking attention for a
perceived hopelessness of his life,
diagnosed emotional disorder

2/22/74
Nixon

Samuel Joseph Byck

Attempt to carry out a nihilistic
plan, diagnosed emotional disorder

9/5/75
Ford

Lynette Alice Fromme

Seeking attention for legal plight of
cult leader Charles Manson,
diagnosed emotional disorder

9/22/75
Ford

Sara Jane More

Seeking attention due to stresses of
being a police informer and member
of the radical underground, diagnosed
emotional disorder

3/30/81
Reagan

John Wamock Hinckley

Seeking the attention of his love
interest, actress Jodie Foster,
diagnosed emotional disorder
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CHAPTER V

CASE STUDIES - NON-PRESIDENTIAL

During the years 1969 through 1992 there occurred eighteen events involving
nineteen victims that fulfill the definitional parameters of assassination used in this
research. A brief synopsis of each event follows.

Non-Presidential Victims

Joseph A. Yablonski

Joseph A. "Jock" Yablonski, an opposition leader in the United Mine
Workers, was shot and killed in his home in Washington, Pennsylvania, on December
21, 1969. Also murdered in the break-in of his residence were his wife and daughter.
Paul E. Gilly, Claude E. Vealey and Aubran W. "Buddy" Martin were arrested and
convicted of the murders. A conspiracy was uncovered and United Mine Workers
President W.A. "Tony" Boyle was convicted of ordering the killing.

A Boyle

Lieutenant, Albert E. Pass, was convicted as the person actually hiring the gunmen
on Boyle’s behalf. Boyle had Yablonski killed because Yablonski had continued in
his effort to unseat Boyle as the union president, alleging Boyle’s corruption,
misappropriation of union funds and tampering with union elections.

72
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Larrv N. Kurivama

Larry N. Kuriyama, State Senator, Hawaii, was shot and killed outside his
home in Honolulu on October 23, 1970. Ronald Ching, an assassin believed to have
been hired by organized crime, confessed to the murder.

It was alleged, but

unproven, that he had been hired by Larry Mehau, described as the "godfather" of
Hawaiian organized crime. Mehau was reportedly a close friend and supporter of
then-Govemor George Ariyoshi and it was further alleged that the assassination was
accomplished on behalf of Ariyoshi. Those allegations remain unproven.

Marcus A. Foster

Marcus A. Foster, Superintendent of Schools, Oakland, California, was shot
and killed outside his office on November 6, 1973.

Russell Little and Joseph

Remiro, members of the radical underground Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA),
murdered Foster because of certain school administration policies that were opposed
by the SLA. An assistant to Foster, who was not a target of the assassination, had
accompanied Foster and was also shot and seriously wounded. Although Little and
Remiro were convicted of the murders, their convictions were later overturned
because of a legal issue in their trial. The fact that they were the killers was not in
question.
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James Lawless

James Lawless, Superior Court Judge, State of Washington, was killed on June
3, 1974, by a pipe bomb mailed to his Spokane office. Ricky Anthony Young was
identified and convicted of the murder. Young, who was on probation for a previous
offense, killed the judge because he was angry about an upcoming hearing in the
judge’s court to revoke his probation and incarcerate him.

James R. Hoffa

James R. "Jimmy" Hoffa, President, Teamsters Union, disappeared following
a meeting at a restaurant in Bloomfield Township, Michigan, a Detroit suburb, on
July 30, 1975. Although his body has not been recovered and his disappearance
remains unsolved, speculation has run rampant.

Conventional wisdom presumes

Hoffa to be dead at the hands of organized crime with which he had an association.
The disposition of his body has become the subject of legends.

Orlando Letelier

Orlando Letelier, a former Defense Minister in the cabinet of the Allende
Administration, Chile, was killed as he drove in Washington, D.C., on September 21,
1976, by a bomb which had been planted in his car. Letelier was openly and harshly
critical of the Pinochet regime and its human rights abuses at that time. Michael
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Townley, an American national who was an agent of DINA (Direccion de
Intelligencia Nacional), the Chilean secret police, was identified as the assassin.

George Moscone and Harvey Milk

George Moscone, Mayor of San Francisco, California, and Harvey Milk,
Supervisor, were shot and killed in their City Hall offices on November 27, 1978.
A former Supervisor, Dan White, was arrested at the scene. White killed the mayor
because he was denied reappointment as Supervisor. The conservative White killed
Milk for Milk’s open homosexuality and his strong advocacy of homosexual rights.
Milk also opposed White’s reappointment. White’s mental state at the time of the
offense became a trial issue with the defense alleging White’s impaired capacity
because of stress and the debilitating effects of junk food. This became known as the
"Twinkie defense." White was convicted of manslaughter and imprisoned for seven
years, which enraged the homosexual community and caused them to riot in San
Francisco. Shortly after his release, White committed suicide.

William Hawkins

William Hawkins, Mayor of Phoenix, Illinois, was shot and killed outside his
home on October 16, 1979.

He was murdered by two Phoenix police officers,

Thomas Childs and Bobby Joe Anderson, who were allegedly contracted to do so by
the Phoenix Chief of Police, Christopher Barton. Investigators first believed that the
motive was because the mayor had cracked down on police corruption in connection
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with bribes from a house of prostitution. Investigators later believed that the mayor
was himself involved in the corruption and the murder resulted from a dispute among
criminals. It was never conclusively established which of the scenarios was factual.
Childs was convicted of the murder, but Anderson was acquitted despite a statement
from Childs. Evidence was insufficient to prosecute Barton.

John H. Wood

John H. Wood, U.S. District Judge, was shot and killed in San Antonio,
Texas, on November 29, 1979. Charles V. Harrelson (father of television actor
Woody Harrelson) was apprehended and convicted of the murder. He was allegedly
hired to kill Judge Wood by Jamiel Chagra, a reputed drug smuggler, who was not
prosecuted because evidence against him was insufficient.

Janet Smith

Janet Smith, Mayor o f St. Albans, Vermont, was shot and killed at her home
on March 16, 1980, one week after assuming office. Mayor Smith was murdered by
Tauno Jarva, a long-time domestic employee, who was disgruntled over being fired
by the mayor.

Russell G. Lloyd

Russell G. Lloyd, a former Mayor of Evansville, Indiana, was shot and killed
by Evansville resident Julie VanOrden. Ms. VanOrden was involved in a property
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use dispute with the City of Evansville and was unaware at the time she shot Mr.
Lloyd that he was no longer mayor.

Henry A. Gentile

Henry A. Gentile, a Municipal Judge in Chicago, Illinois, was shot and killed
in his courtroom on October 21, 1983, by a former Chicago policeman, Hutchie T.
Moore. The judge was murdered as he presided over a divorce proceeding in which
Mr. Moore was a party. Mr. Moore, who was confined to a wheelchair, also shot
and killed the attorney representing his wife.

Alan Berg

Alan Berg, a radio talk-show host, was shot and killed outside his home in
Denver, Colorado, on June 18, 1984. He was murdered by Bruce Pierce and David
Lane, members of the anti-Semitic, right-wing group The Order, a splinter cell of the
racist Aryan Nation. Both were charged and convicted in connection with federal
civil rights law violations, but two other associates, Jean Craig and Richard Scutari,
were acquitted. The alleged organizer of the assassination, Robert Matthews, was
killed later in 1984 in a shootout with agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Alex Odeh

Alex Odeh, the Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination League,
was killed on October 11, 1985, by a bomb planted in his office in Los Angeles,
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California. The assassin(s) was not identified, but was believed to be a member or
members of the radical Jewish Defense League in a demonstration/retaliation in the
continuing conflict in the Middle East.

W,L, Bajlgy

W.L. Bailey, a Municipal Judge in Pensacola, Florida, was shot and killed in
his courthouse chambers on July 28, 1987, by Clyde Melvin. Judge Bailey was
presiding over a divorce case involving Melvin, who believed he was being treated
disadvantageous^. Melvin also murdered his wife’s attorney and his sister-in-law,
who were also in the courthouse at the time.

Robert C. Vance

Robert C. Vance, a U.S. Court of Appeals Judge, was killed on December 16,
1989, by a parcel bomb mailed to his office in Birmingham, Alabama, by a white
supremacist, Walter Leroy Moody, Jr. Judge Vance was widely known for his procivil rights judicial decisions.

Meir Kahane

Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the radical Jewish Defense League, was
shot and killed on a New York City street on November 5, 1990. El Sayyid Nosair,
an Arab activist and suspected terrorist, was arrested and charged with Kahane’s
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murder. He was not convicted of the murder, but was convicted of possession of a
firearm in connection with the slaying. This incident was another demonstration/
retaliation in connection with the conflict in the Middle East.

Manuel de Dios Unanue

Manuel de Dios Unanue, a journalist and editor of a Spanish-language
newspaper and Spanish-language magazines published in New York, was shot and
killed in a restaurant in Queens, New York on March 11, 1992.

Investigators

determined that a contract for de Dios’ murder was offered in the amount of $20,000
by Jose Santacruz Londono, an alleged kingpin of the Cali drug cartel in Colombia.
Another cartel member, John Mena, actually arranged the killing, which was carried
out by Alejandro Wilson Mejia Velez, then sixteen years old.

De Dios was an

outspoken and ardent crusader against drugs and had written many revealing articles
about the Colombian drug cartels, the Cali cartel in particular. Mejia and Mena were
indicated by a New York grand jury and arrested. Their cases are currently pending.

Summary of Non-Presidential Assassination Events

From 1969 through 1992, the United States experienced eighteen nonpresidential assassination events. One event resulted in two assassination victims. All
nineteen victims were killed as a result of the attacks. Eighteen of the victims were
men.

Eleven of the victims were elected officials or candidates to an election.

Tables 3 and 4, which appear on pages 82 and 84, chronologically reflect these events.
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The assassinations occurred in all regions of the United States with no
significant concentration in any one area.

There was no identifiable geographic

pattern. Eleven of eighteen attacks occurred indoors. The outdoor attacks exhibited
the same characteristic as the presidential incidents in that the victim was arriving or
departing a site.
The gun was the preferred method of assassination with fourteen victims killed
in this manner. Bombs were used in four of the attacks and the method of attack
against one (Hoffa) remains unknown.
The assailants were identified in fifteen of the incidents. Six attacks were
committed by multiple assailants.

Three attacks resulted in ancillary murders of

family members or associates not meeting the definitional criteria of an assassination
victim.
Motives could be reasonably established by the data even in those cases in
which the assailant(s) failed to be identified. The victims were known for views or
activities with the potential to provoke assassination.

In each of those cases no

credible alternative explanation could be developed.
Five assassinations, those of Yablonski, Kuriyama, Hawkins, Wood and de
Dios could be identified as murder by contract. Considering his known organized
crime connections, in a different context to be sure, the assassination of Hoffa is
strongly suspected to have been a contract killing, as well.
Five assassinations, those of Foster, Berg, Odeh, Vance and Kahane,
dramatized political causes. The victims were symbolic as well as personal targets.
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One assassination, Letelier, was accomplished by an agency of a foreign
government for the purpose of silencing a vocal critic of the ruling elite.

The

assassination of de Dios was very similar, except that it originated from foreign-based
organized crime. Although the assassinations of Odeh and Kahane likely had foreign
connections, the assassination of Letelier remains unique among assassinations in this
research.
Also unique was the single event involving the assassinations of Moscone and
Milk. The killing of Moscone was the result of a personal grievance against the
mayor for his failure to reappoint the assailant to the position of Supervisor. The
grievance against Milk was more symbolic in connection with Milk’s open
homosexuality and advocacy of homosexual causes, although Milk also openly
opposed White’s reappointment. Nevertheless, essentially different motives provoked
two assassinations within one event.
Five assassinations, those of Lawless, Smith, Lloyd, Gentile and Bailey, were
for reasons of personal grievances. Only the killing of Mayor Smith apparently had
no connection with her official position. The assassins of Lawless, Lloyd, Gentile
and Bailey had very personal motives stemming from official activities of the victims.
Ironically, through a tragic miscalculation by the assailant, Lloyd was actually no
longer a public official at the time of the attack against him.
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Table 3
Victim - Method - Result - Venue: U.S. Assassinations/
Attempts (Non-Presidential)

Date

Victim

Method/Result

Venue

12/31/69

Joseph A. Yablonski
Union opposition leader.
United Mine Workers

Gun/killed

Washington, PA/
indoor

10/23/70

Larry N. Kuriyama
State Senator, Hawaii

Gun/killed

Honolulu, HI/
outdoor

11/6/73

Marcus A. Foster
Superintendent of Schools,
Oakland, CA

Gun/killed

Oakland, CA/
outdoor

6/3/74

James Lawless
Superior Court Judge,
State of Washington

Bomb/killed

Spokane, WA/
indoor

7/30/75

James R. Hoffa
President, Teamsters
Union

Unknown/
presumed killed

Bloomfield
Township, MI/
unknown

9/21/76

Orlando Letelier
former Defense Minister,
Allende Administration,
Government of Chile

Bomb/killed

Washington, DC/
outdoor

11/27/78

George Moscone, Mayor
Harvey Milk, Supervisor
City of San Francisco

Gun/killed

San Francisco, CA/
indoor

10/16/79

William Hawkins, Mayor
City of Phoenix, IL

Gun/killed

Phoenix, IL/
outdoor

11/29/79

John H. Wood, Jr.
U.S. District Judge

Gun/killed

San Antonio, TX/
outdoor
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Table 3-Continued

Date

Victim

Method/Result

Venue

3/16/80

Janet Smith, Mayor
City of St. Albans, VT

Gun/killed

St. Albans, VT/
indoor

3/22/80

Russell G. Lloyd
Former mayor, City of
Evansville, IN

Gun/killed

Evansville, IN/
indoor

10/21/83

Henry A. Gentile
Municipal Judge
City of Chicago

Gun/killed

Chicago, IL/
indoor

6/18/84

Alan Berg
Radio talk-show host

Gun/killed

Denver, CO/
outdoor

10/11/85

Alex Odeh, Director
Bomb/killed
American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination League

Los Angeles, CA/
indoor

7/28/87

W.L. Bailey
Municipal Judge
Pensacola, FL

Gun/killed

Pensacola, FL/
indoor

12/16/89

Robert C. Vance
U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge

Bomb/killed

Birmingham, AL/
indoor

11/5/90

Meir Kahane, Rabbi
Founder, Jewish Defense
League

Gun/killed

New York, NY/
outdoor

3/11/92

Manuel de Dios Unanue
Editor and journalist

Gun/killed

Queens, NY/
indoor

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84
Table 4
Assailant - Motive: U.S. Assassinations/
Attempts (Non-Presidential)

Event

Assailant(s)

Motive

12/31/69
Yablonski

Paul E. Gilly
Claude E. Vealey
Aubran W. Martin

Contract killing by U.M.W.
President W.A. "Tony" Boyle

10/23/70
Kuriyama

Ronald Ching and
others unidentified

Contract killing by Hawaiian
organized crime elements

11/6/73
Foster

Russell Little
Joseph Ramiro

Demonstration of causes espoused
by the Symbionese Liberation Army

6/3/74
Lawless

Ricky Anthony Young

Upset over a pending hearing in the
judge’s court to revoke Young’s
probation

7/30/75
Hoffa

Unknown

Believed contract killing by
organized crime elements

9/21/76
Letelier

Michael Townley

Chilean secret police execution,
victim was openly critical of ruling
Pinochet regime

11/27/78
Moscone
Milk

Dan White

Failure of mayor to renew White’s
appointment as city supervisor;
Milk’s openly avowed homosexuality
and advocate for those causes

10/16/79
Hawkins

Thomas Childs
Bobby J. Anderson

Contract killing by Phoenix police
officers allegedly on behalf of their
chief; public corruption possibly
involving police and victim
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Table 4-Continued

Event

Assailant(s)

Motive

11/29/79
Wood

Charles V. Harrelson

Contract killing allegedly on behalf
of Jamiel Chagra, an accused drug
smuggler

3/16/80
Smith

Tauno Jarvis

Domestic employee of victim,
disgruntled over firing

3/22/80
Lloyd

Julie Van Orden

Property dispute with city; assailant
unaware victim was no longer mayor

10/21/83
Gentile

Hutchie T. Moore

Killed both judge and lawyer
representing assailant’s spouse in
divorce case

6/18/84
Berg

Bruce Pierce
David Lane

Killed for liberal political views by
right-wing, anti-Semitic group The
Order (Aryan Nation)

10/11/85
Odeh

Unidentified member.
Jewish Defense League

Demonstration of Arab-Israeli
conflict

7/28/87
Bailey

Clyde Melvin

Judge presided over divorce case in
which Melvin believed he was being
treated disadvantageous^

12/16/89
Vance

Unidentified member,
"Americans for a
Competent Federal
Judiciary" (previously
unknown)

Racially motivated because of
judge’s pro-civil rights case rulings

11/5/90
Kahane

El Sayyid Nosair

Demonstration of Arab-Israeli
conflict
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Table 4~Continued

Event

Assailant(s)

Motive

3/11/92

Alejandro Mejia Velez
John Mena
Jose Santacruz Londono

Victim an anti-drug crusader,
contract by Cali, Colombia, drug
cartel
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CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

This research was able to examine twenty-three assassination events, five of
them at the presidential level, which occurred in the United States from 1969 through
1992. The data were first presented as descriptive case study narratives. Relevant
factors were then extracted and listed in tables enabling the reader easier comparative
access. Appropriate to this approach, analytical generalizations will be proffered in
lieu of inferential statistics (Yin, 1989).
The format of this section will be to first analyze the data reflecting the
respective research questions from Chapter III. Analysis of the data reflecting the
National Commission hypothesis will follow. The section will conclude with analysis
of any ancillary findings.

Frequency

A research question asked, are there any changes in the frequency of
presidential assassinations/attempts during the research period by comparison with the
time period of the National Commission study? The National Commission discovered
than an average of one in four presidents as having been assassination targets prior
to 1969 (1969, p. 10). Clark Larsen observed that six of nine presidents since World
War II have been attacked, resulting in the death of one and the serious injury to
87
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The typology of James W. Clarke is more useful for categorizing the
presidential assassination incidents.

His focus on the situational factors and

underlying motives allow typing of the people who commit the acts. His typology
centers on the assassin, not the assassination. This makes his typology dependant
upon collecting an abundance of data concerning the assassin, which is generally
available in these high-profile assassinations.
There exists, however, a flaw in Clarke’s typology.

His model does not

readily accommodate a hired assassin, a for-profit killer if you will. The typology
of J. Bowyer Bell by contrast clearly identified a category of killers that are willing
to assassinate simply for financial gain (1979, p. 54). The National Commission
typology, focusing upon types of events rather than types of assassins, can
accommodate a hired killer in the context of its first four types (the fifth type deals
with irrational psychotics). A hired killer could coincidentally fit into Clarke’s types,
but not by design. If profit is the sole motivator, that person is atypical to Clarke’s
typology. To illustrate, Clarke found James Earl Ray, the assassin of Dr. Martin
Luther King., Jr., to be atypical. Ray in fact has long been suspected of being a
hired assassin and it could be this consideration that made the typing of Ray
problematic for Clarke.

Nevertheless, the presidential-related data of this study,

which come from the period after King’s assassination, clearly support Clarke’s
typology.
Both the National Commission and Clarke typologies for different reasons pose
difficulties in relating to non-presidential events. Assassinations committed for non
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political motives are atypical in the National Commission typology, although the
events may fulfill its definitional parameters of assassination. It was not demonstrable
by the data that the assassins of Lawless, Moscone, Milk, Smith, Lloyd, Gentile and
Bailey were irrational mentally ill people that would enable their attacks to be
categorized into Type V. Their situations are clearly inappropriate to the remaining
types.
The Clarke typology encounters difficulty in typing the contract killers of
Yablonski, Kuriyama, Hawkins and de Dios. If the assassination of Hoffa was in fact
murder-for-hire, as suspected, the assassin(s) would likewise by atypical. Again,
while those assassins may exhibit traits described in Clarke’s types, it was a financial
motive and not those psychological traits that induced them to kill or at least induced
them to kill the specific target for which they were hired.
As a practical matter, one other difficulty is encountered in utilizing Clarke’s
typology in non-presidential assassinations. Unless the person who is assassinated is
prominent with the intense scrutiny, media coverage, and availability of information
that normally accompanies such prominence, there is generally a paucity of the
essential background, psychological and situational information available regarding
the assassin in order to assign a type. That is not to say that the typology is not
applicable, but it suggests that a researcher is likely to encounter great difficulty, if
not impossibility, in gathering sufficient data to make typing meaningful. This, of
course, is not likely to ever be a problem in evaluating presidential assassinations,
assuming the assassin is identified.
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Test of Hypothesis

A hypothesis developed by the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence formed a major focus for analysis in this research.

The

hypothesis states that the higher the office, the more impersonal and political the
motive is for assassination; and the lower the office, the more personal and less
political the motive is for assassination. A comparison of the two levels of the
assassination phenomenon, presidential and non-presidendal, brought the meaning of
the hypothesis into sharper focus and allowed for a more expansive test of it than in
the research of the National Commission.
All five presidential assailants were diagnosed as suffering from emotional
disorders and all were deemed to have used the act of assassination as an attentiongetting device. But this commonalty was manifested by underlying motives unique
to each of the individuals. The president or candidate was clearly a symbolic target
of each of the five assassins. The assaults were attempts to attract public attention to
their own issues not at all related to the presidency. In regard to attracting attention,
each of their attacks succeeded, although no fatalities resulted. In such a symbolic
act the victim’s death was not a prerequisite to claim some success.
The four presidents attacked were Republicans, although Hinckley initially
stalked Jimmy Carter, a Democrat. George Wallace was a third-party independent
candidate (and formerly a Democrat), although his assailant initially stalked a
Republican president (Nixon). Since Republicans dominated the presidency during
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the study period and target changes were made by two assailants (Bremer and
Hinckley), a party affiliation is not a relevant factor supportable by the data.
Significant commonalties such as political philosophy, policies or surrounding
controversy (although Byck did refer to Watergate before attacking President Nixon)
did not appear in the data. In fact. President Ford, the only president to experience
two attacks, enjoyed a generally amiable public image. The National Commission
observed that the assassin is able to kill a president because the office is the target
rather than the officeholder (1969, p. 68).

Our modern assassins have had

remarkably little animosity toward their victims. The president becomes symbolic of
society rather than presenting a partisan officeholder (1969, p. 98). J. Bowyer Bell
deemed the individuals most dangerous to presidents as those suffering social isolation
th a t"... adapt to stress by symbolizing their problems in a political idiom identified
with the president" (1979, p. 74). Thus, based on all the above materials, it can be
said that these data support the first half of the hypothesis that the higher the office,
the more impersonal and political the motive for assassination.
The motives of the presidential assassins, although reflecting individual
agendas, were symbolic acts with little or no personal animosity toward their victims.
Non-presidential assassinations, however, revealed more diverse motives. There were
contract killings to eliminate opposition, killings on behalf of causes, and killings for
very individual personal grievances. Invariably the victims were selected for things
they said, did or represented.
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With respect to the second half of the hypothesis that the lower the level the
official, the more personal and less political the motive is for assassination, the cases
presented herein tend to be supportive but inconclusive.

Of eighteen persons

assassinated, six (Foster, Milk, Berg, Odeh, Vance and Kahane) can be termed as
symbolic and personal killings for political reasons. To be sure, the majority of the
non-presidential murders were based upon specific personal grievances against the
victims. The National Commission found th a t"... a very small portion of the deadly
attacks against officeholders was rationally calculated to advance political aims of the
assassin" (1969, p. 10). This seems at some variance with the data of this study.
Consider, in non-presidential assassinations presented in this report, clearly eleven
(Yablonski, Kuriyama, Foster, Letelier, Hawkins, Wood, Berg, Odeh, Vance,
Kahane and de Dios) of the eighteen incidents had some rationally planned political
impact.
None of the presidential assassination attempts during this period could be
attributed to a paid assassin, unlike several of the non-presidential attacks.

Paid

assassins are likely to be reluctant to attempt a presidential murder because of greater
perceived problems of detection and escape due to the presence of large numbers of
law enforcement personnel. Escape is a prerequisite to their success.
All presidential attacks studied were perpetrated by individuals acting alone.
Six non-presidential events were known to have the involvement of more than one
individual. It is highly probable that, given the circumstances of the assassinations,
the murders of Hoffa and Odeh may also have involved multiple assailants.
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The National Commission found that officials killed by members of organized
crime either involved themselves in activities with the criminals or their activities
threatened the organized crime status quo (1969, p. 11).

Those victims in this

research who were attacked by or on behalf of organized crime were invariably found
to fulfill one of these criteria.
The National Commission observed that assassinations of members of the
judiciary had little discernible political content (1969, p. 38). This study contained
the murders of five judges. Only the killing of U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Robert
Vance in 1989 could be connected to a political motive (his position and rulings on
civil rights matters). The remaining judges were murdered for specific, personal
reasons in connection with court cases over which they presided.
Thus, for the second half of the hypothesis the data are not conclusive.

Gender, Race, Ethnicity

For the first time women appeared as presidential assassins (Note: Maiy
Surratt’s participation in the Lincoln assassination considered spurious by many
historians). If one considers Deborah Butler as having represented a serious potential
threat to President Bush (see Prologue), then the involvement of women is even
greater than the data presented in the body of this report. In any event, two of five
presidential assailants from the case studies are women. Only one non-presidential
attack could be attributed to a woman. This data suggests that women have clearly
become full participants as presidential assailants.
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Racial minorities, however, continue to be absent from the list of presidential
attackers. At least three non-presidential assassinations (Foster, Hawkins and Gentile)
were known to have been committed by members of racial minorities. Gentile was
murdered by a member of a racial minority who was confined to a wheelchair, which
constituted the only assault by a physically disabled person. Odeh and Kahane were
killed by members of distinct ethnic groups. However, no conclusions based on race
or ethnicity seem warranted by the data.
Assassinations of Letelier and de Dios were essentially "foreign” assassinations
accomplished on American soil and are unique in this research. No conclusions,
however, can be made in that regard.
This chapter has addressed the following issues vis-a-vis presidential and nonpresidential assassinations and attempts:

comparative frequency of presidential

assaults, macro and micro venues of presidential and non-presidential incidents,
weapons used at both levels of assassination, and the comparative mortality of
presidential and non-presidential attacks. The issue of whether or not the act of
assassination constitutes political participation was also explored. The present data
was used to test the typologies of the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence and of James W. Clarke, which approached the assassination
phenomenon from very different perspectives. Finally, one hypothesis was tested
using qualitative rather than quantitative techniques and found that the data was
overall supportive of the hypothesis.
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another (1986, p. 1). In summing up the frequency of attacks in his 1977 study,
James McKinley predicted that the next presidential assault would occur not later than
1984 (1977, p. 223). This turned out, of course, to be a conservative estimate with
the attempt on the life of President Reagan in 1981.

Prior to 1969, thirty-six

presidents suffered seven assassinations/attempts over a period of 181 years. One of
six presidents, one president-elect and one presidential candidate were attacked with
an average interval of twenty-two years. During the period of this research, three of
five presidents and one presidential candidate were attacked with an average interval
of four and one-half years. This increase is reflected in the data presented in Table
5. No other similar block of time in American history can be created to simulate the
assassination frequency of the research period. It should be noted that these data
demonstrate past activity and may be of very limited value as a predictor. The issue
of frequency cannot effectively be addressed with respect to non-presidential
assassination events, as equivalent data for the pre-1969 period was not compiled for
this research. All that can be said in that regard is that there were numerically more
non-presidential attacks than presidential attacks in the time period of this study.
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Table 5
Frequency of Presidential Assassinations/Attempts by Decade

Decade

Victim (year)

1789 - 1799
1800 - 1809
1810- 1819
1820 - 1829
1830 - 1839

Andrew Jackson (1835)

1840 - 1849
1850 - 1859
1860 - 1869

Abraham Lincoln (1865)

1870 - 1879
1880 - 1889

James A. Garfield (1881)

1890 - 1899
1900 - 1909

William McKinely (1981)

1910 - 1919

Theodore Roosevelt - candidate (1912)

1920 - 1929
1930 - 1939

Franklin D. Roosevelt - President-elect (1932)

1940 - 1949
1950 - 1959

Harry S. Truman (1950)
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Table 5-Continued

Decade

Victim (year)

1960 - 1969

John F. Kennedy (1963)

1970 - 1979

George Wallace - candidate (1972)
Richard Nixon (1974)
Gerald R. Ford (1975)
Gerald R. Ford (1975)

1980 - 1989

Ronald Reagan (1981)

1990 - 1993

George Bush ?

Venues

Can any macro or micro trends in assassination venues be identified? Of the
five presidential assassination events during the study period, four occurred in
connection with public events at which the victim appeared. Only President Nixon
was to be attacked in the White House. In connection with assaults at public events,
all occurred as the victims were in movement departing the event.

By contrast,

eleven of eighteen non-presidential attacks occurred indoors at both public and private
places. The non-presidential incidents that took place outdoors exhibited the same
characteristic as presidential incidents in that the victims were arriving or departing
respective sites.
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The city venues otter a more mixed view. In two of the presidential attempts
(Wallace and Reagan) the assassins traveled inter-city to their victims.

In fact,

Bremer had stalked Nixon in Ontario earlier in the year, and Wallace in Michigan and
New York, prior to his attack. In the two attempts against President Ford and the
one against President Nixon, the assassins resided near the sites where the incidents
occurred.

Presidential and non-presidential assassination events occurred in all

regions of the United States with no significant saturation in any one area.
Considering both macro and micro venue issues, no conclusions seem
warranted by the data.

Method

Is there any common assassination method?

Four of five persons who

attempted assassination at the presidential level used handguns of various calibers.
Bremer, Moore and Hinckley used revolvers and Fromme used a semi-automatic
pistol. Ironically, it was to President Ford’s good fortune that Fromme selected the
weapon she did, because she was apparently unaware that she had to place a bullet
into the gun’s chamber to be capable of firing. A very strong argument can be made
that this oversight saved the President’s life.
In non-presidential assassinations, guns were likewise the preferred weapons
with fourteen of the victims assaulted thusly. However, another type of weapon, the
bomb, was used in four of the murders. The type of weapon used against Hoffa is
not known.
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Samuel Byck’s planned use of a jetliner as a weapon deserves special mention.
His intention to kill President Nixon by this method should be considered an
aberration and perhaps a product of mental illness. The efficacy of using an aircraft
to target a specific individual is tenuous at best and would require the ultimate
refinement of the World War II kamikaze technique. Further, in an apparent leap of
faith, Byck must have assumed that President Nixon would be at the White House,
where the airplane was to be crashed.
Based on the data, guns remain the favored tool of assassins in America.

Mortality

Are there any differences in mortality between presidential and nonpresidential assassination events? As presidential and non-presidential incidents are
juxtaposed, it is glaringly apparent that presidential attacks during the study period
resulted in no fatalities, while victims of all the non-presidential assaults were killed.
Besides chance, there are a few possible explanations for the difference in
outcome. Presidents and presidential candidates receive protection from the Secret
Service. While history has demonstrated that this is far from foolproof in preventing
attacks, a competent protective force most certainly places obstacles and limitations
on the assassin’s access to the protected person. Conversely, without those limitations
of access, typical of non-presidential victims, assassins enjoy a greater selection of
target opportunities to better ensure that the assault is lethal.
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The issue of access coordinates with another difference:

all but one

presidential attack occurred in conjunction with public appearances by the victims.
By contrast, all non-presidential assassinations occurred in private settings.

For

example, although Orlando Letelier was killed on a public street in Washington, he
was not attending a public event and was in the privacy of his car, in which the bomb
had been planted.
Further, within the planning efforts cf the Secret Service, presidential victims
have more immediate availability to emergency medicine in the event they are
assaulted. The possible need for medical care is anticipated. There was nothing in
the data to indicate that any of the non-presidential victims anticipated a need for
medical care or were able to seek it in any timely fashion.
The data of this research leads one to conclude that non-presidential
assassination attempts are more likely to result in lethal outcomes than presidential
assassination attempts.

Political Participation

Do the data support including assassination as an act of political participation?
"What many historians regard as the work of an unbalanced mind may in reality be
the work of a mind using the symbolic content of government institutions for its own
psychic needs. To say that this is not in part a political act is erroneous..." (National
Commission, 1969, p. 102).
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If one considers this issue from the perspective of victimology, then it would
be difficult to argue that all the events presented herein are not political participation.
This inference would be based on outcomes that necessarily had at least some political
ramifications.
However, it is upon the intentions of the assailants which we must focus.
After all, it is the assailant who is the alleged political participant. The fact that
presidential assassins in this research have pursued a political outlet in which to make
their symbolic statements compels one to consider their acts to be the extreme in
negative political participation. It is through a political outlet, albeit a destructive
one, that they sought to create change as they perceived it.
Lester Milbrath focused his book on the decisions an individual makes whether
or not to participate politically, and, if so, the intensity and duration of the
participation (1965, p. 6).

In establishing a hierarchy of political action, he

emphasized that his hierarchy is not intended to describe acts "...designed to disrupt
the normal operation of democratic political processes or to dislodge a regime from
office by violent means..." (1965, p. 18).

He chose to have his model reflect

positive and conventional acts of political input.
Milbrath acknowledged that some potential participants fail to participate
because they have a sense of anomie, a term coined by Emile Durkheim. In defining
his use of this concept, Milbrath said, "Anomic persons exhibit a lack of values and
lack of direction; they feel ineffective; they tend to believe that authority figures do
not care about them; activity loses its point and urgency" (1965, p. 78).
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While

reserving his hierarchy for those activities which positively reinforce the political
process, Milbrath seems to acknowledge the pull of negative forces, which at the
extreme could include assassination. His "anomic" person would describe some of
the assassins in this study and form a basis in part for Clarke’s typology.
Sidney Verba and Norman H. Hie defined political participation as "... those
activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the
selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (1972), p. 2).
Although they included in their research instruments only positive activities such as
regular voting, donating money and participation in civic causes, their definition of
political participation does not appear to exclude the act of assassination. Further,
they argued against hierarchies of political participation such as that developed by
Milbrath. They asserted that those hierarchies implied that one who engages in an
act requiring the greatest effort necessarily has participated in those acts of lesser
efforts (1972, pp. 44-45). Their criticism supports an inference in the present study
that assassins participate at the level of greatest effort and may well omit participation
at lower levels. The actions of any assassin whose sole political participation is
his/her act of assassination would be vindicated by the criticism of Verba and Nie,
which rejected the idea of a progressive hierarchy. Lower levels of participation
would not necessarily be a prerequisite for an act of assassination, and, in fact, would
be unlikely actions of persons who view the society or their own circumstances as
normless or meaningless (anomic persons).
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David Horton Smith and associates defined unconventional political behavior
as "... acts of disruption, destruction, and injury within a political community against
the political regime, its actors, or its policies" (1980, p. 134). This definition readily
accommodates the definition of assassination used in this research. Assassination may
in fact be the ultimate extension of their definition.
In. further focusing upon unconventional participation and drawing from
Milbrath, Smith observed that "... if alienation is both an instigation to political
violence and a cause of apathy and withdrawal, additional evidence is needed to
determine when one or the other will occur" (1980, p. 149).

By asserting this

duality, it further accommodates an assassin as a person who may pursue a negative
direction upon receipt of a political stimulus (Milbrath, 1965, p. 18).
Robert E. Lane concluded that a person suffering emotionally may well
withdraw from close personal contacts, such as with family members, but may then
vigorously pursue political interests as an outlet (1959, p. 116). He further concluded
that political aggression is a product of frustration and is exacerbated by problems of
emotional upheaval and lack of self-control of the individual (1959, pp. 118-119).
"Thus a person may reveal his characteristic manner of handling aggressive feelings
by withdrawal and apathy or by launching into some outburst against a political figure
..." (1959, p. 120).
As with the other topics of this research, non-presidential assassins present a
more mixed picture with respect to the issue as to whether their acts constitute
political participation or not. There can be no doubt that a government agent killing
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a member of the political opposition (Letelier) is an intentional political participant
in the politics of his own country, Chile, in this instance. Likewise, those persons
that kill to demonstrate a political cause or grievance (for instance, the killers of
Foster, Mascone, Milk, Berg, Odeh, Vance and Kahane) are participating in the
political process at some level of government in the United States, albeit in a negative
and unconventional format.
Presenting a different picture, however, are the hired assassins and the
assassins with non-political personal reasons for their acts. They appear to lack any
discernible political motives. Based on what is known about what caused them to
kill, the assassins of Yablonski, Kuriyama, Lawless, Hawkins, Wood, Smith, Gentile,
Bailey and de Dios (and likely Hoffa) are not political participants. Said another
way, in the purely personal or contracted assaults the victims’ political significance
was only coincidental. It as meaningless as a motivator for the killers and they in no
way had any intentions to abrogate political situations or make political statements.
With respect to contract killings, however, it may be that the person or persons who
offer the contracts are politically motivated and could be considered political
participants even thought the actual killer cannot be so regarded.

Test of Typologies

Do the data support the typologies developed by the National Commission
and/or by James W. Clarke?

The National Commission found all presidential

assaults, except the attack on President Truman, to be caused by the mental illness
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of the assailant. James W. Clarke countered by saying that the phenomenon of
assassination involves a more complex interaction of the assassin’s personality and
situational factors in his/her life (1990, p. 128).

Interestingly, the National

Commission years earlier had similarly made the observation that the assassin "... is
by and large outside the main social and political stream of the society, and who is
responding to cues that others are not likely to recognize" (1969, p. 44).

The

National Commission acknowledged, but did not develop, the types of situational
factors considered by Clarke.
Nevertheless, to deem each of the presidential assassins presented in this study
as a psychotic person with an irrational motive overly simplifies and grossly
misrepresents their cases.

Herein resides the major problem with the typology

developed by the National Commission. The Commission’s Type V categorizes all
those mentally ill persons has having irrational motives. By the limitations that define
that type, an argument can be made that none of the five presidential assassins can be
adequately typed according to the criteria of the National Commission. Since the
cognitive distortions of reality associated with psychosis were absent (with the
possible exception of Byck), one can argue that within their own logic, each had a
rational motive. That was the basis for the criticism Clarke raised in developing his
own typology.
James W. Clarke asserted that in the zeal to offer neat and tidy explanations
for assassinations, particularly at the presidential level, the motives of the assassins
are reduced to generalities and cliches of the vagaries of mental illness (1982, p. 75).
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In fact he termed this a "reductionist" explanation of American presidential
assassination. He argued that by ignoring the life contexts of these individuals, some
political grievances that are not necessarily irrational are likewise ignored. He said
that biases are thus created that hold any deviation from that which is considered
normal as evidence of mental illness. Some of that "deviance" may actually fall
within ranges of normal behavior.
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that Lynette Fromme committed her
act to demonstrate a perceived injustice and therefore can be categorized into the
National Commission’s Type IV. It may also be plausible to argue that Samuel Byck
was irrationally delusional because his assassination plan was so bizarre and thus be
categorized into Type V. Remaining are the issues of typing Arthur Bremer, Sara
Moore and John Hinckley. Bremer and Moore were found to be mentally competent,
held accountable and imprisoned.

Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of

insanity and committed to a psychiatric hospital. However, let us not become mired
in the legal issue of insanity and ignore their situations, backgrounds and underlying
motives. Were their solutions to life’s problems so completely irrational within the
contexts of their lives? Maybe so, maybe not. In any event, their acts resist typing
by National Commission criteria. In applying the data of this research, the National
Commission typology appears inadequate to describe the recent American experience
with presidential assassination events. The attacks of Bremer and Moore, and likely
Hinckley, are atypical by their standards.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

"The Jackal: a killer at the top of his profession, a man unknown to any
Secret Service in the world, an assassin with a contract to kill the world’s most
heavily guarded man ..." (Forsyth, 1971). The reality of the fictional Jackal has
thankfully been absent from the American experience. Nevertheless, the threat of
assassination remains pernicious to American society. In this concluding section we
will examine where we have been and attempt to look ahead.

Retrospective

As the phenomenon of assassination has been presented in presidential and
non-presidential formats, so will this retrospective.
Presidential assassinations seem to have followed past trends. Assaults against
U.S. presidents continue to be symbolic and impersonal. The assassins studied in this
investigation emerged from those persons in American society suffering emotionally
and feeling the sense of isolation that often results. For anyone to buy into the cliche
that American presidents are killed by insane people just because they are insane
grossly rationalizes a problem that then makes detection and prevention tenuous. By
arguing for an approach that examines situational, psychological and background
factors, James W. Clarke seriously questioned the reliability of the Type V category
107
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of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. That type
identifies an assassination as resulting from psychotic persons with irrational motives.
While some individuals may well fall within those criteria, others clearly do not.
Clarke vehemently criticized that category as a caricature and its overuse for many
years in the operational understanding of the United States Secret Service and other
security agencies.

Clarke’s argument becomes cogent when examining the

presidential case studies presented herein.
As the assassination attempts of Bremer, Fromme, Moore and Hinckley were
researched, there were indications that these people were aware of the nature and
consequences of their acts but chose to disregard those consequences. It is important
to note that this observation is independent of any legal outcomes of their cases.
Using Clarke’s situational approach, however, there seemed an inevitability to their
acts. In their respective life situations, an assassination seemed the only recourse, a
solution to a problem that had become unbearable. An attack against a president
appeared designed for the maximum focus of attention on their respective problems
rather than on the death of a president. They made symbolic uses of the presidency,
and there appeared a certain rationality and design to each act.
Non-presidential assassinations presented quite different issues from those
presidential. Non-presidential assassinations seemed to span three broad categories
of motivations: purely personal, contractual to eliminate opposition, and killings to
symbolize internecine struggles. The events that were studied occasionally overlapped
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these categories, but suffice it to say that the many events were discemibly different
from one another and almost diametrical from the presidential assassination attempts.
Remarkable was the number of non-presidential assassinations involving
organized crime.

Aside from a few theories surrounding the assassination of

President Kennedy, organized crime has been notably absent from presidential
assassinations.

As possible reasons, non-presidential victims presented targets of

easier access. Further, the victims’ connections to organized crime, whatever the
context, were direct and unambiguous. Assassinations of these lower level officials
may have allowed the criminals to address their goals and grievances more directly
and immediately.
This research also reflected a rising problem of courtroom violence and attacks
against the judiciary. It should be noted that the sampling in this study excluded
several incidents of courtroom violence as it was determined that the judge was a
"bystander" and not an intended target.

Assessing Assassination Impact

Assessing the impact of assassination is speculative at best and very elusive to
quantify.

Havens, Clark and Leiden (1975, p. 201) observed a complication in

assessing impact in that all political systems are dynamic and changing to some extent
with or without the occurrence of an assassination.

The National Commission

concluded similarly and offered the observation that the impact of assassination differs
with the type of political system and type of society (1969, pp. 6-7).
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The long-term impact of individual assassinations is best left to future studies;
although there are a few immediate and tangible results that can be described here.
The 1972 assassination attempt against presidential candidate George Wallace
not only affected his health permanently, but also ended his ability to seriously
challenge for national office. He did make a brief but unsuccessful presidential bid
in 1976, but the momentum of his once viable third-party candidacy had been lost.
The assassination attempt temporarily at least altered the American political landscape.
James W. Clarke (1990, p. 126) observed that when John Hinckley was found
"not guilty by reason of insanity," the public and legal outcry was such that it
precipitated the Defense Reform Act of 1984. That new law clarified the insanity
legal defense and provided the additional verdict of "guilty but insane."
After the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan, former Press Secretary
James Brady, the most seriously wounded of the victims, took up the cause of
promoting national control of firearms. The prominence of his involvement has
caused the proposed legislation to be popularly known as the Brady Bill.
The impact of the threat of assassination can be observed in victim behavior.
When security measures increased markedly after his wounding, President Reagan
said in a classic bit of understatement, "I tried it the other way once outside the
Hilton Hotel. I didn’t like it" (Jenkins, 1983, p. 5).
Presidents invariably undergo alterations in their styles to accommodate
security measures with their interaction with the public. This flexing and trading of
less exposure for greater security is the fodder of new articles particularly surrounding
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new presidents unaccustomed to the restrictions of stringent security. In an article
written for the Washington Times on January 15, 1993, then President-elect Clinton
told reporter Frank J. Murray, "You could live your whole life in that bubble if the
Secret Service had its way. You can’t let the security bubble shut you down. It’s
hard enough to say in touch with people as it is." Reporter Murray noted that Clinton
is not the first president to "chafe against security." On May 13, 1993, USA Today
reported that, "During the campaign, he [President Clinton] would plunge into
crowds, 10-deep, stretching for blocks. But Wednesday, he was followed by two
limousines. The crowd was confined to half-a-block. Beyond that small tableau, the
streets were cleared of civilians for two blocks in all directions."
In non-presidential assassinations, there are also indications of the impact. For
instance, with the increase in courtroom violence and assaults against the judiciary,
courtroom security at all levels is increasing exponentially. The public can no longer
enter federal courtrooms or areas of judicial chambers without passing through metal
detectors. There has been a corresponding increase in court security officers and
electronic monitoring equipment. This trend is rapidly spreading into lower courts,
particularly those that hear family (divorce, child custody) cases.
Paul Wilkinson (1986, p. 103) noted that assassins and terrorists can exploit
those rights and freedoms that define a liberal state.

They can move about in

anonymity, which of course impedes detection by security forces. Security forces are
likewise limited in protective measures that can be undertaken.
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James McKinley (1977, p. 223) laments that despite the limitations, the
extremity of modem protective precautions "... reaches a critical point of diminishing
returns ... that is when the leaders of a democracy are so isolated from their
constituents ... that the democratic process breaks down for want of genuine
communication ..." He continued with the irony th a t"... our assassins, who have so
many times killed for their peculiar vision of liberty, would have split a cornerstone
of the nation’s true freedom."

Prospective

This report has examined assassinations of the recent past in an endeavor to
reveal the nature of assassination in contemporary America. Forecasting trends is
tricky in any business, but a modest attempt must be made here.
Paul Wilkinson stated an observation of many (including the National
Commission) that the United States exhibits a relatively low incidence of political
violence, which is quite remarkable given the "... size of the population, high crime
levels, the wide availability o f firearms, and the plethora of ethnic, religious and
ideological minority groups" (1986, p. 107).
That observation notwithstanding, the general level of violence in American
society seems to have risen steadily during the period of this research. As individuals
and groups continue to redress their perceived grievances through the barrel of a gun,
there is no reason to expect any decline in attacks against officials. As previously
reported, this violent trend has manifested itself significantly in the courtroom. If a
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case is not decided in one’s favor, the implication seems to be that a verdict through
violence can be achieved. And current levels of job-related violence would suggest
that future victims similar to George Moscone and Harvey Milk are likely. Increased
security measures that are taking place would seem to signal concurrence in that
prognosis. In any event, there is no reason to believe that as violence increases,
public or political officials will be spared.
Presidential assassination prediction is even more tenuous. James W. Clarke
(1982) readily acknowledged that his typology, though insightful, has little predictive
value. Still, it is of use to the Secret Service and other interested agencies. As he
reported in his follow-up study (1990, p. 128), how dangerous a person may be
cannot be accurately diagnosed or predicted. The mental state and the situational
factors must be considered before an evaluation of dangerousness can be conducted.
There is no way presently known to predict whether or not the person will be violent,
or, if so, the direction of the violence. If one examines the traits associated with each
of the types of Clarke’s typology, it should become apparent that many people in
society suffer the identical mental and emotional illnesses experienced among assassins
but never become violent. Some that do exhibit those characteristics do become
violent but turn the violence on themselves, family, friends, strangers or various
prominent, non-politically relevant persons.
Clarke suggested that by identifying various emotional, behavioral and
situational traits, patterns may emerge in common with those of previous assassins
(1990), p. 129). What caused Mark Chapman to kill John Lennon, the former
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Beatle, while John Hinckley chose Ronald Reagan? Security forces must continue to
operate on the premise that, if enough of these emotional/behavioral/situational factors
can be discovered, potentially dangerous people can be so identified. Can this be
done with any precision under the best of circumstances? The short answer is no, not
with the current body of knowledge (or lack of knowledge) concerning human
behavior.

As Clarke probably rightly observed in his first research (1982),

presidential assassinations are also the results of opportunity and circumstance. There
are people in the society who might well have committed an act of assassination but
never had the opportunity to do so.
The National Commission has suggested that to reduce the threat of
assassination, there should be an attempt to reduce the prominence and visibility of
the presidency as a symbol (1969, pp. 108-109). The attempt should be to portray
the president as just another cog in the giant wheel of government. Physical exposure
to the public should be limited through the ample use of television. The styles and
formats of our presidential campaigns should be altered.

While the National

Commission’s observations must be taken seriously, for the most part the suggestions
are unrealistic and unworkable in the real world.

Presidents will resist being

cloistered and will go only so far in taking precautions.

They are exceptionally

political beings and will only allow so much space to be created between them and
their public. Likewise there is little or no chance that the American presidential
electoral process will be greatly altered from the current format, which encourages
and virtually requires personal contact by the candidate with the public.
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Clarke (1982) saw little value in increased domestic surveillance since it would
be mostly ineffective against persons acting alone, as has been our typical
assassination experience up to now. He and some of the other authors studied for
insights into this research did see some value in gun control, but no one suggested it
as a serious major preventative measure.
The monumental task for the Secret Service continues to be the discovery of
that lone, anonymous future assassin, whoever he or she may be, while at the same
time remaining vigilant for the terrorist attack that may come at any time.

Future Research

There are so many aspects to the phenomenon of assassination that create a
wealth of future research possibilities. Just a few will be outlined here.
First, a caveat should be offered to future researchers. Assassination as an
area of study is beset with significant obstacle, namely the paucity of primary source
material.

Occasionally an assassin may leave a diary behind or make a public

statement, but establishing motives in particular often involves dependence on
secondary source material.

This is even more problematic in investigating non-

presidential assassinations. Strong triangulation is suggested.
The study conducted by the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence (1969) was so far-reaching that it could not possibly be
replicated within the scope of this investigation. Certain hypotheses could not be
tested by the present data, but should be subject to further testing.
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That National Commission concluded in a cross-national comparative study
that the United States exhibited a high relative incidence of assassination (1969),
p. 128). The Commission also found the incidence of assassination directly correlated
to extreme political violence such as guerrilla warfare and revolution (1969, p. 129).
Assassination in the United States, while relatively high in incidence, has occurred
without that genre of political turmoil. With the increase in frequency of presidential
assassination attempts during the period of this study, further research could
investigate whether or not that increase is correlated with any episodes of political
turmoil or social unrest.

The cross-national comparison could also be extended

through the study period to determine whether or not the trend identified in 1969 has
continued.
In this study women emerged as ready and willing participants as presidential
assailants. Notably absent in presidential attacks were assassins representing racial
minorities. The National Commission addressed that issue briefly (1969, p. 66). At
that time it believed the absence of black American presidential assassins to be
psychologically related to a historic underclass status. The Commission alleged that
the expectations for achievement in that group were generally low, resulting in less
of an expectation-achievement gap and presumably a lower level of frustration
(anomie).

With the absence of racial minority participation in presidential

assassination attempts during this study period, that phenomenon would present an
appropriate future investigation. No matter the premise, gender, racial and ethnic
considerations in the American phenomenon of assassination are areas to be explored.
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Epilogue

As this thesis was nearing completion, yet another assassination investigation
was being jointly commenced by the Secret Service and FBI.

This time the

investigation involved a former president.
At the invitation of a grateful Kuwait, Former President George Bush visited
that country on April 14, 1993.

After basking in Kuwaiti adulation, Mr. Bush

returned to the United States on April 16.
Days later Kuwaiti authorities announced that they had thwarted an elaborate
attempt to assassinate the former president while he was in Kuwait. They reported
that on April 13 several cars were intercepted crossing the border between Kuwait and
Iraq. The vehicles contained sixteen people, eleven of whom were Iraqi nationals,
and 550 pounds of explosives.
Through interrogation of the suspects, Kuwaiti officials uncovered what they
described as a rather ambitious plan to assassinate Former President Bush and commit
other acts of sabotage and mayhem inside Kuwait.
The plot to assassinate Bush allegedly consisted of three alternatives. The first
plan called for several Iraqi agents to shoot the former president as he deplaned upon
arrival. If that was found not to be possible, the next scenario was for a remotecontrolled car bomb to be planted at Kuwait University, where Bush was to appear.
Lastly, if the first two plans were found not to be feasible, one of the conspirators
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had volunteered to strap explosives to his body, gain proximity to Bush, then detonate
the pack committing suicide and killing the former president.
The Kuwaiti government kept the matter a secret until well after the Bush
visit. Since then, they have characterized the plot as sanctioned by Saddam Hussein,
and one of the conspirators, Wali al-Ghazali, said that he received is orders to
assassinate Bush from agents of Hussein.

Predictably the Iraqi Government

disavowed any connection.
For a time, "the day of the Jackal was over" (Forsyth, 1971).
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Appendix A
Data Collection Coding Sheet
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A - Political Status of Victim
1 - officeholder
2 - non-officeholder/politically prominent
3 - candidate
4 - other
B - Victim Gender
1 - female
2 - male
C - Victim Race
1 - Asian
2 - black
3 - Hispanic
4 - white
5 - other
D - Assailant Gender
1 - female
2 - male
3 - unknown
E - Assailant Race
1 - Asian
2 - black
3 - Hispanic
4 - white
5 - other
6 - unknown
F - Method of Attack
1 - firearm
2 - knife
3 - bomb
4 - other
G - Venue of Attack
1 - indoor
2 - outdoor
H - Access by Public
1 - public
2 - private

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I - Motive
1 - replacement of one political elite by another
2 - terrorize and undermine the legitimacy of ruling elite
3 - suppress political challenge
4 - dramatize/propagandize an ideology
5 - mental illness/psychopathology
6 - unknown
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